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BACK TO THE BRIARPATCH: 
AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL META-ANALYSIS 
IN STATE ACTION DETERMINATIONS 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.* 
I was born and raised in the briar patch, Brer Fox! 
Born and raised in the briar patch.1 
Brer Rabbit, after claiming repeatedly that he would prefer al-
most anything to being thrown into the briarpatch,2 expressed glee 
once tossed there.3 In fact, Brer Rabbit wanted to be in the 
briarpatch because, like most rabbits, he could navigate the 
briarpatch with relative ease: the briarpatch was home. 
Over the course of a century, the Supreme Court has developed 
a great degree of familiarity with the state action doctrine, a doctri-
nal briar patch. Like Brer Rabbit, the Court has disclaimed repeat-
edly any interest in being there.4 Writing for the Court only last 
term, Justice Scalia described the state action doctrine as "difficult 
terrain" and deftly avoided traversing it.5 Justice Scalia's acknowl-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis. B.A. 1987, M.A. 1987, 
Emory; J.D. 1991, LL.M. 1991, Duke. - Ed. I am grateful for the invaluable advice and 
assistance provided by Professor William Van Alstyne. I would also like to acknowledge the 
contributions of S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Andrew M. Ray, Nancy M. Olson, Catherine S. 
Stempien, and Michael D. Granston, who were all instrumental in the development of this 
piece. 
1. Juuus LESTER, THE TALES OF UNCLE REMus, THE ADVENTURES OF BRER RABBIT 16 
(Dial Books 1987) (retelling JOEL C. HARRis, UNCLE REMUS (1921)). 
2. To be specific, he ostensibly would rather have been hanged, decapitated, or drowned 
than thrown into the briarpatch. JOEL CHANDLER HAruus, UNCLE REMUS 18 (1921}. 
3. Id. at 19. 
4. See, e.g., Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 964 (1995); Edmon-
son v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632-33 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that although the Court's state action cases have not been "a model of consistency," a "co-
herent principle has emerged," which should lead to predictable results); Moose Lodge No. 
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (noting that the state action principle is "easily stated," 
but conceding that the proper analysis of state action questions is not always a simple task}; 
see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982) (disposing of the 
state action analysis in a two-sentence footnote); cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 
(1966) ("[G]eneralizations do not decide concrete cases."). In other cases, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly invoked the talisman of state action and has conducted its state action 
analysis in a fashion suggesting that its state action tests generate relatively certain outcomes. 
See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-38 (1982); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149, 156-66 (1978). 
5. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 964 (1995). 
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edgment that state action doctrine is difficult terrain is not surpris-
ing; unlike Brer Rabbit, the Court has demonstrated a seeming 
inability to maneuver in the underbrush once finding itself there.6 
The state action doctrine, with its intricate mantras and talismanic 
phrases, has been and remains a dark thicket of constitutional law. 
Since at least 1879, the Court has consistently held that the guar-
antees of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights 
protect citizens only from acts committed by the government, and 
has required plaintiffs asserting claims under these provisions to es-
tablish the presence of "state action" before undertaking an analy-
sis of the merits of a particular claim.7 These amendments "erect[] 
no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or 
wrongful."8 
The state action inquiry is not particularly difficult when an 
agency or officer of the government has allegedly violated the con-
stitutional rights of an individual.9 The analytical exercise can be-
come decidedly squirrelly, however, when the actions of an 
ostensibly "private" entity violate constitutional norms, and the en-
tity enjoys some kind of special relationship or connection to the 
federal or a state government.10 
To be sure, the law generally - and constitutional law in partic-
ular - is often ambiguous, and judges are required to exercise dis-
cretion when deciding almost every matter that comes before 
them.11 Thus, judges - like rabbits - should be reasonably com-
fortable in the briarpatch because their jobs routinely require them 
to be there. Nevertheless, the state action doctrine has proven es-
pecially difficult for the federal judiciary to administer. 
In an attempt to bring order to the subject, the Supreme Court 
has developed three distinct tests for determining whether the rela-
6. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 297, 299 (1966) {"What is 'private' action and what 
is 'state' action is not always easy to detennine."). 
7. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 2, 11 {1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 
629, 638-40 {1882); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 {1879); see also Public Utils. Commn. 
v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 461 {1952) (applying the state action requirement to federal constitu-
tional claims). 
8. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
9. See Lebron, 115 S. a. at 972-74. See generally Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 
922, 937 (1982) ("Our cases have ... insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the depriva-
tion of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State."). 
10. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). As Justice 
O'Connor has observed, the Court's cases "deciding when private action might be deemed 
that of the state have not been a model of consistency." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
11. See K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 134-35, 179-80, 187-92 {1960); WILLIAM 
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF 'IHE FIRST AMENDMENT 47-49 {1984). 
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tionship between a private entity and the government is sufficient 
to justify attributing the private entity's behavior to the state.12 
These tests have proven difficult to apply in practice and arguably 
have done little to improve either the quality or consistency of state 
action determinations. Largely because of the difficulties associ-
ated with applying the tests, a number of academics have seriously 
questioned their value as analytical tools.13 
In this article, I argue that the existing tests for establishing the 
presence of state action are helpful in framing the state action ques-
tion, but, as applied by the federal courts, they have all too often 
frustrated meaningful inquiry into the true relationship between os-
tensibly private actors and the federal or a state government. 
Wholesale abandonment of the tests, however, will not resolve this 
problem. Instead, courts conducting state action analyses must go 
beyond the mechanical application of the traditional tests to deter-
mine if, in the totality of the circumstances, a particular private en-
tity is a state actor.14 Essentially, I advocate a constitutional "meta-
analysis"15 that would improve the accuracy and fairness of state 
action determinations. 
Part I presents an overview of contemporary state action doc-
trine, with particular attention to the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation. 16 Part 
II demonstrates the shortcomings - and absurdities - associated 
with the contemporary state action doctrine. In this Part, I argue 
that recent decisions of the lower federal courts reflect a failure in 
practice to honor the Supreme Court's admonition that its various 
12. As will be explained more fully, infra, these tests are: (1) the "exclusive government 
function" test, see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-62 (1978); Nixon v. Condon, 
286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932); (2) the "nexus" or "regulation" test, see Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); and (3) the "symbiotic relationship test," see Burton v. 
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
13. The state action doctrine has been described as "incoheren[t]," Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 505 (1985); a "doctrine that makes no sense," 
id. at 556; a "protean concept," Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLuM. L. 
REv. 1083, 1085 (1960); and a "conceptual disaster area," Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme 
Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposi-
tion 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). On the other hand, the doctrine has also been 
described as "the most important problem in American law." See id. at 70. 
14. See, e.g., Hollenbaugh v. camegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382, 385 (3d Cir.1976) (con-
sidering both an entity's public function as well as its relationship with the state in making a 
state action determination), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). 
15. "Meta-analysis" involves grouping data from separate scientific studies to reach the 
95% confidence interval required to substantiate scientific claims. State action detennina-
tions could be improved by incorporating a roughly analogous technique. See infra section 
III.A. 
16. 115 s. Ct. 961 (1995). 
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verbal formulations of state action are but "different ways of char-
acterizing [a] necessarily fact-bound inquiry."17 Finally, Part III 
takes up the broader problem of cabining judicial discretion in the 
application of the state action doctrine. This Part presents an alter-
native approach to the contemporary state action analysis, an ap-
proach that is truer to the Supreme Court's repeated exhortation 
that "[ o ]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be given its 
true significance."1s 
The federal courts' use of the various state action tests as for-
mulaic shorthands that yield quick and easy answers represents an 
inappropriate application of the Supreme Court's state action 
precedents. Such jurisprudence has the unfortunate effect of insu-
lating from constitutional scrutiny behavior fairly attributable to the 
state and is significantly underprotective of constitutional rights. 
The Court therefore should abandon sole reliance on these tests in 
favor of a more contextual approach. In short, the federal courts 
should return to the briarpatch, with the recognition that the state 
action doctrine, like Brer Rabbit, was "bred and born there." 
I. A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE STATE ACTION 
DOCTRINE 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws."19 Since at least 1879, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the "[n]o State shall" language of this clause to limit the 
application of the clause to acts "fairly attributable to the State."20 
Moreover, the Court has also applied the state action requirement 
to cases raising constitutional challenges to actions taken by the 
federal govemment.21 Thus, in any given case, a plaintiff claiming 
the violation of a constitutional right or liberty must first establish 
17. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982). 
18. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); see also Reitman v. 
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967). 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. 
20. See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879); see also 
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-14 (1883) (reiterating state action requirement and 
citing Ex parte Virginia in support of the proposition). 
21. See Public Utils. Commn. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 
U.S. 323, 330 (1926); see also Lebron v. ·National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-91 
(2d Cir. 1993), revd., 115 S. Ct 961 (1995); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 590-94 (D.C. 
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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that the alleged violation is somehow the handiwork of the 
government. 
In approaching the question of governmental responsibility for a 
deprivation of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has estab-
lished a two-track analysis. First, a reviewing court must determine 
whether the defendant "is ... [the] Government itself."22 If the 
defendant is not the government, then the Court must determine 
whether the actions of the nongovernmental entity can "be fairly 
attribut[ ed] to the State"23 through a kind of contacts analysis. The 
nature and scope of both inquiries are described below. 
A. Governmental Entities 
When the defendant in a civil suit is a government agency or 
officer, the state action inquiry is attenuated: government agencies 
and officials must observe the constitutional rights and prerogatives 
of the citizenry.24 Until very recently, however, it was unclear 
whether a governmental entity could avoid its constitutional obliga-
tions simply by incorporating a "private" company to execute a 
public policy. Because a corporate entity is ostensibly private or at 
least can be legislatively declared so,25 lower federal courts had in-
dicated a willingness to excuse government-owned corporations 
from observing constitutional rights.26 
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation,21 the 
Supreme Court rejected this reasoning. The Court held that before 
examining the relationship of the federal government to Amtrak -
22. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 964 (1995). 
23. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. 
24. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
390-97 (1971); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (holding that a 
private entity was not bound by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1193, 1208-12 (1992) (discussing the application of the Bill of Rights to the states and the 
antebellum state jurisprudence that required the state governments to honor certain "natural 
rights" of the citizenry, which included at least some of the rights set forth in the Federal Bill 
of Rights). 
25. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 971-72. 
26. See, e.g., Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(accepting without question congressional characterization of Amtrak as a "private, for-
profit corporation"), revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995); Morin v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 810 F.2d 
720, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that Conrail is not a state actor because of its corporate 
nature); Andersen v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 754 F.2d 202, 204-05 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that Amtrak is not a state actor because of its corporate form and congressional 
designation as a "private" entity); Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 
1229, 1232-35 (8th Cir.) (holding that the GNMA is not a state actor), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
847 (1980); Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
2399, 2403-08 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that the CPB is not a state actor). 
27. 115 s. Ct. 961 (1995). 
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in other words, engaging in a contacts analysis - it was first neces-
sary to determine whether Amtrak, as a government-created, con-
trolled, and maintained corporation, constituted a component of 
the federal government.2s 
Lebron involved a First Amendment challenge to Amtrak's de-
cision to refuse to permit an advertisement parodying the Coors 
family's alleged support of right-wing political groups in Central 
America. Lebron, an artist, purchased the right to display a work 
of art depicting Nicaraguan villagers being menaced by a silver 
Coors beer-can missile.29 After Amtrak's sales agent accepted 
Lebron's purchase of advertising space to display the picture in 
New York City's Penn Station, Amtrak exercised its contractual au-
thority with the agent to refuse the advertisement.3o Lebron then 
sued, claiming that Amtrak's refusal to display his work violated his 
First Amendment rights. Applying the three state action tests and 
relying on prior circuit precedents, the Second Circuit found that 
Amtrak could not violate Lebron's speech rights because it was not 
a state actor.31 
On appeal from the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court recast 
the question presented for review. Rather than asking whether 
Amtrak, as a private entity, constituted a state actor, the majority 
instead inquired into whether Amtrak was really a "private" entity 
separate and distinct from the federal government.32 The Court 
"conclude[d] that [Amtrak] is an agency or instrumentality of the 
United States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed 
against the Government by the Constitution."33 
Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Scalia went on to observe 
that "[i]t surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able 
to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution 
by simply resorting to the corporate form."34 Thus, if "the Govern-
28. 115 s. a. at 964. 
29. 115 S. a. at 963-64. 
30. 115 S. a. at 964. 
31. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-92 (2d Cir. 1993), revd., 
115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). 
32. 115 S. a. at 962-68. The Second Circuit's opinion accepted without question the 
private character of Amtrak, based on Congress's statutory declaration that Amtrak is "not 
••• an agency, instrumentality, authority, or entity, or establishment of the United States 
government." Lebron, 12 F.3d at 390; see 45 U.S.C. § 541 (1988). The Second Circuit did not 
consider whether Amtrak constituted a component of the federal government, focusing in-
stead on whether Amtrak could be deemed a state actor because of its extensive connections 
to the federal government. 
33. 115 s. a. at 972. 
34. 115 s. a. at 973. 
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ment creates a corporation" in order to promote "governmental 
objectives" and retains effective control over the corporation, the 
corporation is a component of the government itself.35 
The Lebron decision effectively mandates a new first step in 
state action analysis. Rather than assuming the private character of 
an entity, plaintiffs would do well to first consider whether it is 
plausible to argue that the entity is in fact a component of the gov-
ernment. 36 Consistent with Lebron, governmental agencies cannot 
escape the mantle of sovereignty by drawing up articles of incorpo-
ration. Essentially, Lebron appears to reject the sovereign-
commercial acts dichotomy that exists in international law.37 The 
federal and state governments, unlike a foreign sovereign, cannot 
operate commercial enterprises in the same fashion as private citi-
zens; neither the federal government nor a state government may 
act as a capitalist, free and clear of any constitutional constraints.38 
One could argue that Lebron stands only for the more limited 
proposition that a government-controlled corporation is a state ac-
tor if the government's involvement in the corporation relates to a 
public policy - in other words, that the government's participation 
in the enterprise is a kind of quasi-sovereign function. Consistent 
with this interpretation of Lebron, if the government's involvement 
with a corporation were merely accidental and did not reflect or 
serve an identifiable public policy objective, the corporation might 
not be a state actor. 
Although this kind of government involvement with a corpora-
tion might be theoretically possible, most, if not all, existing 
35. 115 S. Ct. at 974-75; see also Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978). 
In Chalfant, the Third Circuit held that the state cannot avoid its constitutional obligations by 
using an agent to execute its policies because a contrary rule would permit "any state [to] 
avoid the reach of the fourteenth amendment over any governmental function merely by 
turning over the administration of that function to [an agent]." 547 F.2d at 746. 
36. For example, if the federal government opened a McDonald's restaurant across the 
street from the White House, perhaps in response to its current resident's passion for 
McFood, the McDonald's restaurant would be a state actor - notwithstanding the commer-
cial nature of the enterprise - so long as the government retained control over the owner-
ship and operation of the restaurant and opened the restaurant to promote a public policy 
objective. 
37. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1605(a)(2). 
Under the FSIA, the "commercial activities" of foreign governments are not protected by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. In other words, a foreign government may be sued in the 
United States for the acts or omissions of a commercial enterprise under its direct control. 
Thus, the FSIA treats a corporation owned or controlled by a foreign sovereign as a private, 
rather than a public, entity. Cf. Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 
1235 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concurring) (arguing that the GNMA, a wholly owned, government-
controlled corporation, is not a state actor because it "functions only in a traditionally non-
sovereign capacity"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980). 
38. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 972-75. 
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government-controlled corporations - entities like Amtrak, the 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC), and the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting (CPB) - exist to effectuate clearly defined public 
policies and should therefore come within Lebron's ambit. More-
over, a broad interpretation of Lebron's scope is both theoretically 
and legally sound. 
If the government can escape its constitutional obligations by 
resorting to the corporate form, constitutional guarantees are of lit-
tle value indeed.39 Make no mistake, the point is not a minor one. 
The violation of a particular substantive right by the government 
must be a matter of greater concern than violations of such rights 
by purely private entities.4o Identifying government responsibility 
for violations of constitutional rights is essential to maintaining the 
rule of law under our Constitution. 
Thus, the historic willingness of federal courts to acquiesce in 
the government's claim that corporations it controls are not state 
actors and therefore are free to disregard constitutional constraints 
is both disturbing and deeply counterintuitive.41 The government 
does not cease to be the government simply because it has assumed 
the form of a corporation, any more than a vampire ceases to be 
vampire because it has assumed the form of a bat. 
A government employee's constitutional rights should therefore 
not be contingent on whether the employee works at the Depart-
39. See 115 S. Ct. at 973. 
40. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 503-11, 536-42. Chemerinsky emphatically 
rejects this position, arguing that any violation of a right accorded constitutional protection 
should be actionable regardless of whether the state is in any way involved in the violation. 
Id. at 509-11, 524-27. Chemerinsky's position disregards the importance of the principle of 
limited government enshrined in our constitutional system, see infra note 109, and the special 
dangers associated with government-sponsored lawlessness. Like a large and dangerous 
river, once the government leaves its banks, it may well prove difficult, if not impossible, to 
restrain. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (providing a vivid exam-
ple of the Court's inability or unwillingness to restrain governmental disregard of citizens' 
civil rights in a time of crisis); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 55-66 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 
(permitting the discharge of a government employee based on her lawful political affiliations 
and rejecting her claim to meaningful process prior to her discharge for disloyalty), affd. by 
an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). In consequence, particular vigilance is both 
appropriate and necessary regarding violations of fundamental rights that are attributable to 
the government. If a social consensus exists that a particular right should also be protected 
against private infringement, Congress and the state legislatures are free to create such pro-
tection through suitably drafted legislation. 
41. Presumably, this jurisprudential trend will not survive the Supreme Court's decision 
in Lebron. This result, however, is not necessarily a certainty. See, e.g., Alliance for Commu-
nity Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 118 n.10 (D.C. Cir.) (suggesting in dicta that government-
controlled corporations - even post-Lebron - are not necessarily state actors), petition for 
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 95-124). Amazingly, Judge Randolph, 
writing for the en bane court, cited Lebron for the proposition that government-sponsored 
and controlled corporations are not state actors, demonstrating the adage that old habits are 
hard to break. 56 F.3d at 118 n.10. 
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ment of Housing and Urban Development or at a government-
owned McDonald's restaurant. In both cases, the government is 
and should be subject to constitutional constraints. Cases that 
reach a contrary result, like the Second Circuit's decision in 
Lebron, 42 reflect the courts' misguided attempt to permit the gov-
ernment to act as a market participant with the same freedom and 
subject to the same conditions that a privately owned and operated 
enterprise enjoys.43 
The argument, of course, is that if the government is to operate 
a railroad or an airline or a McDonald's restaurant effectively, in 
other words, at a profit, the government-sponsored enterprise can-
not be constrained to observe the procedural due process rights and 
speech rights that apply to more traditional governmental entities.44 
Government-owned and operated enterprises, like Amtrak, can 
compete effectively with private sector competitors only if they are 
not burdened with the costs associated with observing these consti-
42. The Second Circuit held that Amtrak was not a state actor, in part, because of prece-
dent finding that Conrail was not a state actor, but also because Amtrak did not satisfy com-
pletely any one of the three state action tests. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 
F.3d 388, 390-92 (2d Cir. 1993), revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). Lebron was not, however, the 
only case to find that a government-created, owned, and controlled corporation did not con-
stitute a state actor because of a statutory declaration that the corporation was private. See 
Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Servs., 697 F.2d 447, 448-52 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that PRLS 
is not a state actor); Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 1232-35 
(8th Cir.) (holding that GNMA is not a state actor), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Liberty 
Mortgage Banking v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Co., 822 F. Supp. 956, 958-60 (E.D.N.Y. 
1993) (holding that FHLM is not a state actor); Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. 
Broadcasting, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399, 2403-08 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that the CPB 
and PBS are not state actors); see also Jackson v. Culinary Sch. of Wash., 788 F. Supp. 1233, 
1265 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the Student Loan Guaranty Association is not a govern-
mental entity). Of course, the continuing validity of these cases is open to question in light of 
the Supreme Court's holding in Lebron. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 968-69, 972-75. Because 
the facts in Lebron were quite strong - the federal government maintains both de jure and 
de facto control over the National Railroad Passenger Corporation - it is possible that the 
lower federal courts will find that government-sponsored corporations subject to less direct 
forms of government control are not components of the government itself and therefore are 
not state actors. 
43. The Second Circuit's opinion in Lebron reflects a strong concern for allowing a 
government-owned and operated business to get on with the business of business. See 
Lebron, 12 F.3d at 390-92; see also Warren, 611 F.2d at 1232-35. Justice O'Connor's dissent 
in Lebron makes the point quite explicitly: "Because Amtrak's decision to reject Lebron's 
billboard proposal was a matter of private business judgment and not of Government coer-
cion, I would affirm the judgment below." Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 975 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
44. For example, a worker at HUD generally enjoys the right to post-deprivation process 
following discharge. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In a state that observes 
the employment-at-will doctrine, by contrast, a private employer is free to fire a worker for a 
good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all. Consistent with Lebron, because the govern-
ment cannot cease to be the government, it may not avail itself of the same freedom of 
conduct that private entities enjoy in their employment decisions. This will have the effect of 
increasing the operating costs of a government-owned and operated enterprise, causing a 
corresponding decline in its profits. 
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tutional rights. As a consequence, prior to Lebron, the lower fed-
eral courts often attempted to secure for such entities the same 
freedom of action enjoyed by their private-sector competitors.4s 
The flaw in this reasoning is that the government cannot cease 
to be the government by virtue of incorporation.46 If this means 
that government-owned and operated enterprises cannot compete 
effectively with their private sector counterparts, so be it; the gov-
ernment cannot waive the costs associated with observance of con-
stitutional norms.47 The alternative analysis permits the 
government to avoid its constitutional obligations through a proce-
dural nicety. 
Furthermore, from an economic perspective, the government 
can never truly act as a private entity. When the Congress or a state 
legislature decides to support a commercial endeavor, the business 
does not face the same opportunity costs or risk of failure that its 
private counterparts do. Federal Express, a private entity, is con-
strained in countless ways by market forces. For example, it cannot 
run deficits indefinitely; once its capital is exhausted, it will go 
bankrupt. Unlike Federal Express, the U.S. Postal Service, as a 
government-owned and operated enterprise,48 has no real incentive 
to balance its books. The Postal Service does not face the specter of 
bankruptcy and dissolution, no matter how out of balance its ex-
penditures and receipts.49 
Of course, when the government enters the market, it typically 
does so in order to achieve a particular public policy objective that 
might otherwise not be met by the private sector, precisely because 
45. See Lebron, 12 F.3d at 390-92; Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 93-99 (1st 
Cir. 1990); Andrews v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 831 F.2d 678, 682-83 (7th Cir. 1987); Myron 
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 752 F.2d 50, 54-56 (2d Cir. 1985); Anderson v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 754 F.2d 202, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1984). 
46. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 972-75; see also Arcoren v. Peters, 829 F.2d 671, 680-81 (8th 
Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (arguing that when the government functions as a private 
lender, it must "abide by the requirements of the Constitution"). 
47. But see Warren, 611 F.2d at 1232-35 (exempting GNMA from procedural due process 
requirements, notwithstanding its quasi-governmental status), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 
(1980); Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 541-42 (D.D.C. 1986) (exempting 
LSC from observing the First and Fifth Amendment rights of LSC employees); Network 
Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399, 2403-08 (D.D.C. 
1979) (exempting the CPB and PBS from liability for alleged violations of the First and Fifth 
Amendments). 
48. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201, 401 (1988). 
49. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 2002-09 (1988) (conferring broad borrowing and spending authority 
on the U.S. Postal Service); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 ("Congress shall have Power 
... To establish Post Offices and post Roads."). See generally Carrie Stradley Lavargna, 
Government-Sponsored Enterprises Are "Too Big to Fail": Balancing Public and Private In-
terests, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 991 (1993); Don Phillips & John M. Goshko, Amtrak Is Proving Too 
Thick-Skinned for Ax, WASH. PoST, Mar. 31, 1995, at A3. 
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a truly private enterprise cannot be operated on a for-profit basis or 
because a purely private for-profit entity might not operate in a 
fashion consistent with important governmental objectives. For ex-
ample, operating a hospital in an isolated, sparsely populated rural 
county may not be cost-effective but is nevertheless quite necessary, 
at least from the point of view of the county's residents and their 
elected local officials.50 Thus, there are usually sound reasons for 
the government's direct participation in the market.51 
Far from undercutting the argument for treating government-
created and controlled corporations as state actors, the public pol-
icy objectives underlying such activities support the argument. 
Government-sponsored corporations are simply a means of secur-
ing governmental objectives. 
Government participation in the market, however, is not with-
out costs to other market participants. When the government acts 
as a market participant, it shifts, at least in part, the cost of its ineffi-
ciencies onto other privately held competitors in the market.52 
50. Localities maintain or heavily subsidize hospitals and clinics in order to ensure that 
medical services are available within the community. See Lubin v. Crittendon Hosp. Assn., 
713 F.2d 414, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1983) (analyzing the constitutional status of a county-
subsidized medical facility); Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 
261 F.2d 521, 522-24 (4th Cir. 1958) (describing a North Carolina law permitting local govern-
ments to build and operate medical facilities). 
51. Amtrak provides yet another example. Congress established Amtrak to prevent "the 
threatened extinction of passenger trains in the United States." Lebron v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 967 (1995); see also Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. 
L. No. 91-518, § 101, 84 Stat. 1328 (explaining "that the public convenience and necessity 
require" the continuation of passenger rail service). In doing so, it deemed the survival of 
national passenger rail service a sufficiently compelling public policy objective to justify the 
creation and maintenance of a transportation service that the market could not or did not 
support. The New Panama Canal Company provides an additional example of the govern-
ment underwriting an economically inefficient enterprise because of the importance of the 
enterprise to vital congressional policy objectives. See DAVID McCULLOUGH, THE PATII BE· 
TWEEN TIIE SEAS: THE CREATION OF TIIE PANAMA CANAL 1870-1914, at 329-41, 399-402 
(1977); see also Act of June 28, 1902, 32 Stat. 481; GAO, REFERENCE MANUAL OF GOVERN· 
MENT CoRPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 86, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 176-78 (1945). 
52. The secondary home mortgage industry provides perhaps the best example of the 
government acting as a market-participant. See Charles L. Edson, Public Assistance for 
Housing: Past, Present, and Future, 3 PuB. L.F. 77 (1983); Peter E. Kaplan & Elizabeth B. 
Qutb, The Regulatory Environment: An Overview, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE 
BANKING: A GUIDE TO TIIE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 183, 183 (James M. Kinney 
& Richard T. Garrigan eds., 1985). The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23i (1994), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-59 (1994), and the Government National Mortgage Association 
(Ginnie Mae), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1716-23i (1994), are the three principal entities created by the 
federal government to facilitate consumer access to capital for home loans. Ginnie Mae is 
government-owned and operated, Fannie Mae is owned by the government and private 
shareholders, and the nation's savings and loan associations own Freddie Mac. Alfred J. 
Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137, 140-41. To-
gether, these three entities control approximately 10% of the secondary market in home 
mortgages. See Eric J. Murdock, Note, The Due-On-Sale Controversy: Beneficial Effects of 
the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institution Act of 1982, 1984 DUKE L.J. 121, 126. Given its 
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Government does not make business decisions for solely economic 
reasons but rather incorporates various political and social objec-
tives into its operations.s3 Thus, if Amtrak-is able to offer below-
cost transit between Washington, D.C. and New York City, other 
companies offering fungible services will have to subsidize indi-
rectly Amtrak's inefficiencies by lowering their fares to compete. 
Unlike Amtrak, however, private companies do not have the luxury 
of presenting Congress with a bill at the end of the fiscal year.s4 
Government-controlled corporations also derive certain eco-
nomic benefits from their association with the state.ss The market 
places an economic premium on an association with the govern-
ment. For example, securities offered by government-controlled 
corporations command a premium based on the market's assump-
tion that the federal government would probably guarantee pay-
ment of these notes in the event that the government-controlled 
corporation defaults.s6 These benefits provide yet another justifica-
tion for treating government-controlled corporations as state actors: 
significant benefits flow from their formal relationship with the 
government. 
Had the Supreme Court decided Lebron differently and held 
that Amtrak was not a state actor by virtue of Congress's designa-
tion of the company as nongovernmental or because of the nature 
of the activities, the government would have escaped its constitu-
tional responsibilities, and private companies would have borne a 
size and scope, the government's involvement in the mortgage industry has profound effects 
on private-sector enterprises competing in the market. See Lavargna, supra note 49, at 992-
95. Significantly, prior to Lebron, lower federal courts had uniformly found that these enti-
ties were not state actors. See Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 
1233-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Liberty Mortgage Banking v. Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Co., 822 F. Supp. 956, 958-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
53. Amtrak might elect to provide service to sparsely populated states because politicians 
from those states desire such service and possess sufficient political clout to ensure that Am-
trak respects this preference. Service to such states could not be justified on an economic 
basis - it would drive up Amtrak's operating costs without providing an offsetting increase 
in Amtrak's operating revenues. 
54. See, e.g., How Much More Will Amtrak Shrink, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Jan. 2, 
1995, at 12. Amtrak receives almost $1 billion in federal subsidies and runs a $200 million 
annual operating deficit. Id.; see also Phillips & Goshko, supra note 49. 
55. See Arcoren v. Peters, 829 F.2d 671, 678, 680-81 (8th Cir. 1987) (Heaney, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that government-controlled lenders enjoy advantages not shared by private lend-
ers); see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commn., 254 F.2d 857, 859-60 (8th Cir. 
1958) (holding that a government-controlled corporation constituted a component of the 
state for purposes of applying principles of sovereign immunity). 
56. See Ann Mariano, VA Down Payment Plan Rallies Critics of the Budget, WASH. PosT, 
Feb. 3, 1990, at El, E25. See generally Carole Gould, The Top IO Mutual Funds for Ginnie 
Maes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1993, at 35. 
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nontrivial portion of the cost.57 By requiring government-owned 
and operated corporations to observe constitutional rights and lib-
erties, the Court has ensured that legislatures will not be able to 
avoid paying a greater share of the true cost of implementing their 
policy decisions.ss Under Lebron, it will be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for a government-owned and operated entity to compete at 
parity with private-sector enterprises offering fungible services. 
This result, in turn, will force legislators to consider more carefully 
the costs and benefits of underwriting a commercial enterprise.s9 
In sum, the first-level inquiry in any state action case arising 
post-Lebron will be whether the defendant is the government itself. 
H the defendant is a governmental officer, agency, or instrumental-
ity, the state action inquiry is at an end: state action is present.60 
B. Contacts Analysis 
H the defendant is not an officer, agency, or instrumentality of 
the government but rather is a private individual or entity, the 
plaintiff must establish that the private individual's or entity's be-
havior should nevertheless be attributed to the state. Although the 
Supreme Court has established a number of different formulations 
of the state action inquiry at this level, three basic tests have 
emerged: (1) the exclusive government function test; (2) the symbi-
otic relationship test; and (3) the nexus test. Each of these tests 
requires a reviewing court to engage in a kind of contacts analysis in 
57. In a wide variety of contexts, this is precisely what happened in cases before the lower 
federal courts involving government-created, owned, and controlled entities. See Lebron v. 
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-92 (2d Cir. 1993), revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 
(1995); Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 1232-35 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media 
L. Rep. (BNA) 2399, 2403-08 (D.D.C. 1979). 
58. Note also that such a rule will discourage private companies from associating them-
selves with government-sponsored enterprises or projects unless the government is prepared 
to shoulder the costs that the company will incur incident to its new "state actor" status. 
59. Although private sector enterprises will still suffer from government-subsidized com-
petition, the costs of complying with the due process and free speech guarantees of the Con-
stitution will force governmental corporations to charge higher prices or to obtain larger 
governmental subsidies. Higher prices will lead consumers to favor fungible private-sector 
alternatives, and higher government subsidies will force legislators to think twice before es-
tablishing a government-sponsored enterprise. This is not to say that the government should 
never sponsor essentially commercial enterprises. Rather, the government should do so ad-
visedly and only after assessing the full costs associated with a particular endeavor, including 
the externalities. 
60. This leaves open the question of how one goes about deciding that a particular entity 
"is" the government itself. As will be discussed more fully, infra, the Supreme Court en-
gaged in an open-ended analysis of Amtrak's "nature and history" in order to detennine 
whether it constitutes a component of the federal government. Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 967; see 
also infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text. 
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which the court examines both the nature of the defendant and the 
relationship between the defendant's behavior and the government. 
1. Challenges to an Existing Rule of Law 
At the outset, it is important to note that contacts analysis is 
necessary only if the validity of a state or federal law is not directly 
at issue; if a party to a suit is challenging the constitutionality of a 
state or federal law, state action is present, even if a private party, 
rather than the state, is attempting to enforce the particular law. 
Thus, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 61 the Supreme Court found 
that the state action requirement was satisfied in a suit between two 
private parties: 
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama 
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to im-
pose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech 
and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil 
action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by stat-
ute. The test is not the form in which state power has been applied 
but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been 
exercised. 62 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly followed this holding in the 
thirty years since New York Times was decided.63 
Perhaps the best example of this approach is Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 64 the (in)famous pre-New York Times case in which the 
Supreme Court declared the judicial enforcement of racially restric-
tive covenants to be unlawful state action. In Shelley, the Supreme 
Court found that "the particular patterns of discrimination and the 
areas in which the restrictions are to operate, are determined, in the 
first instance, by the terms of agreements among private individu-
als. "65 The Court went on to explain, however, that 
the action of state courts in enforcing a substantive common law rule 
formulated by those courts, may result in the denial of rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the judicial pro-
ceedings in such cases may have been in complete accord with the 
most rigorous conceptions of procedural due process.66 
61. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
62. 376 U.S. at 265 (citation omitted). 
63. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991); Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 {1986); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 
886, 916 n.51 (1982); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 90 n.1 {1980) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring). 
64. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
65. 334 U.S. at 13. 
66. 334 U.S. at 17. 
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The Court held that the enforcement of a state's common law 
rule constituted state action; the common law rule at issue was the 
law of property permitting landowners to establish restrictive cove-
nants running with the land.67 The Court found that the state's 
common laws in question facilitated and perhaps encouraged pri-
vate discriminatory behavior and were therefore unconstitutional. 68 
"[I]t would appear beyond question that the power of the State to 
create and enforce property interests must be exercised within the 
boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment."69 
Shelley has proven controversial because it could be read to 
mean that any court involvement in an essentially private dispute 
satisfies the state action requirement.10 Under this interpretation of 
Shelley, court involvement will transform private contract or prop-
erty disputes into matters subject to the constitutional restrictions 
applicable to the government's behavior.71 Shelley, however, need 
not be construed so broadly. When one considers the fact that the 
common law of property generally disfavors the enforcement of re-
strictive covenants running with the land,72 the opinion is much eas-
67. 334 U.S. at 18. 
68. 334 U.S. at 19-23. 
69. 334 U.S. at 22. 
70. Notwithstanding the academy's strong and consistent criticism of the case, Shelley has 
proven to be an enduring precedent. Indeed, the Supreme Court cited Shelley as good au-
thority only four years ago in a major state action case involving the constitutional status of 
peremptory strikes in civil trials. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 
(1991). 
71. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 27-29 (1959). 
72. "Beginning with an early case, the English courts expressed a policy against the run-
ning at law of the burden of a covenant between owners in fee." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY § 9.14 (A.J. Casner ed., 1952). This reflects a social policy against restrictions 
encumbering the productive use of land. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY, div. V, 
pt. III, intr. note, at 3156-60 (1944); see also id. § 537 cmt. a ("Unless a burden has some 
compensating advantage which prevents it from being on the whole a deterrent to land use 
and development, the running of the promise by which it was created is not permitted."); see 
also Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 
497 n.50 (1962) (describing how the common law did not favor "covenants restraining aliena-
tion indefinitely or for long periods" and suggesting that racially restrictive covenants fell 
within this prohibition). Thus, courts will refuse to enforce restrictive covenants that de-
crease the social utility of a parcel of land without conferring an offsetting benefit. See, e.g., 
Price v. Anderson, 56 A.2d 215, 219-21 (Pa. 1948) (refusing to enforce a restrictive covenant 
because such action would unduly impede development). In consequence, one can think of 
Shelley as a case in which the state courts were required to decide whether a racially restric-
tive covenant conferred more social benefit than cost on the use of property; here is where 
the Fourteenth Amendment enters the scene. Although racial integration of a neighborhood 
in 1948 might have caused property values to fall, avoiding a potential decrease in property 
values that would be directly attributable to racial prejudice is not the kind of social benefit 
that the state may secure through a discretionary application of its law of property. Consider 
and contrast the law of trespass, which enforces the property holder's right to deny access to 
real property generally and without regard to the social costs and benefits associated with 
such behavior. 
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ier to understand. Rather than finding state action because of a 
court's enforcement of a private contract, the state's policy of selec-
tively enforcing restrictive covenants reflected a decision to facili-
tate some kinds of private behavior but not others.73 If only a 
handful of restrictive covenants would be honored, it is odd indeed 
that the state would elect to make a raci_ally restrictive covenant 
one of the chosen few.74 
In sum, a contacts analysis is necessary only if the underlying 
state or federal statutory or common law is not constitutionally 
infirm.1s 
2. The Contacts Analysis Tests 
The Supreme Court's contacts analysis state action tests are 
somewhat deceptive, insofar as their language holds out the prom-
ise of precise, predictable results. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
sometimes acted as though the application of these tests were little 
73. Shelley could also be characterized as a "nexus" case, insofar as it involves a challenge 
to private behavior taken at the behest of the state. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying 
text. 
74. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). A hypothetical demonstrates the rea-
sonableness of this approach. Under the common law, certain kinds of commercial enter-
prises had an obligation to provide services upon the tender of a tariffed fee. Thus, 
innkeepers and ferrymen were legally obliged to render service without regard to the identity 
of the person seeking the service, with certain narrow exceptions. See 3 WILLIAM BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 166 (11th ed. 1791); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 296-300 
{1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing that the common law rule protected citizens' ac-
cess to public accommodation); Uston v. Resorts Intl. Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 373-75 (N.J. 
1982) (holding the common law right to exclude, with respect to property owners who open 
their premises to the public, is limited by the common law right to reasonable access to public 
places). See generally 1873 Miss. Laws, ch. 63, § 1, at 67 (codifying the common law rule 
requiring common carriers and innkeepers to provide service to all comers). But see Hall v. 
DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) (invalidating a Louisiana statute prohibiting common carriers 
from segregating on the basis of race on Commerce Clause grounds). 
Suppose that the government permitted such enterprises to refuse service on the basis of 
race, gender, or sexual orientation but on no other basis? Although the government might 
claim that its law merely accommodates private decisionmaking, the state's decision to create 
a new exception from the general, common law rule to accommodate private acts of discrimi-
nation does not merely facilitate but encourages such behavior. See, e.g., Peterson v. Green-
ville, 373 U.S. 244, 246-48 (1962); Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 818-22 
(D.C. Cir. 1993), revd. in part, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 
3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 95-124). See generally Henkin, supra note 72, at 483 n.20 
(suggesting that the state should be held responsible for acts of discrimination that occur 
when the state legalizes previously prohibited private discrimination). 
75. Thus, a state statute that permitted garnishment of wages without process would be 
subject to challenge on due process grounds if invoked by a secured creditor, despite the fact 
that it is not a governmental entity. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) 
(considering on the merits a due process challenge to the award of punitive damages in a civil 
case between two private parties). See generally Wechsler, supra note 71, at 27 (noting that 
statutory deprivations of constitutional rights constitute state action). 
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different from the application of the Pythagorean Theorem.76 The 
lack of precision in the tests, coupled with the Court's treatment of 
the tests as sacred writ, have understandably exasperated some in 
the legal academy; as Professor Black has noted, "there were and 
are no clear and concrete tests of state action; the concept is notori-
ously, scandalously lacking in these; it is itself nothing but a catch-
phrase."77 Although the Court's state action tests provide more 
guidance than a mere "catch-phrase," as will be demonstrated be-
low, they are not the stuff of Euclidean geometry. 
a. Exclusive State Function Test. If a particular task historically 
has been reserved exclusively to the state, a private party that exe-
cutes the task on behalf of the state will be deemed a state actor. In 
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 18 the Supreme Court noted in dicta 
that "there are a number of state and municipal functions ... which 
have been administered with a greater degree of exclusivity by 
States and municipalities . . . . Among these are such functions as 
education, fire and police protection, and tax collection."79 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have demonstrated that 
then-Justice Rehnquist's dicta in Flagg Brothers was a bit over-
broad; although education and fire protection are quintessential 
government functions, the provision of these services is apparently 
not sufficiently "exclusive" to the government to support a finding 
of state action when education or fire protection services are dele-
gated to private entities.80 "That a private entity performs a func-
tion which serves the public does not make its acts state action."81 
Without a doubt, the exclusivity requirement severely inhibits 
the utility of the exclusive government function test. Beyond hold-
ing elections,82 empaneling juries,s3 and operating jails and pris-
76. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-45 (1982} (applying the three state 
action tests mechanically and with scant attention to nuance or detail}. Alas, the reality has 
not lived up to the promise. As a practical matter, the state action tests have not made state 
action determinations any easier although they have permitted the lower federal courts to 
treat the state action inquiry as a simple one. 
77. Black, supra note 13, at 88. 
78. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). 
79. 436 U.S. at 163. 
80. See Rendell-Baker, 451 U.S. at 842-43 (finding no state action by a federally funded 
school}; Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding no state 
action by a nominally private local fire department). 
81. Rendell-Baker, 451 U.S. at 842. 
82. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468-70 (1953). 
83. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620-23 (1991). 
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ons,84 there are few, if any, government functions that are the 
"exclusive prerogative of the State."85 In consequence, the exclu-
sive state function test as currently interpreted by the Court is 
something of an empty set. 
b. The Symbiotic Relationship Test. Although the continuing 
validity of this test is open to doubt,86 as recently as the October, 
1990 Term, the Supreme Court endorsed the symbiotic relationship 
test as a means of demonstrating the presence of state action.87 
"[I]n determining whether a particular action or course of conduct 
is governmental in character, it is relevant to examine ... the extent 
to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits 
"88 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority89 both defines and pro-
vides the best illustration of the symbiotic relationship test. In Bur-
ton, the government leased space to a diner in a government-owned 
and operated parking garage.90 The diner refused to serve blacks. 
The Court held that the diner was a state actor because "[t]he State 
has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with 
[the diner] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the 
challenged activity."91 The symbiotic relationship test focuses on 
the interrelationship between a private individual or entity and the 
government, giving particular attention to any benefits the govern-
ment receives from the arrangement.92 
84. See Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985). But see 
James Hirsch, What's New in Private Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1987, § 3, at 17 (discussing 
the recent trend toward privatization of prisons). 
85. Jackson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974); see also Rendell-Baker, 
457 U.S. at 830; Musso v. Suriano, 586 F.2d 59, 62 (7th Cir. 1978). Presumably, neither a state 
nor the federal government could escape constitutional responsibility for the treatment of 
prisoners or mental patients by simply delegating responsibility for these affairs to a private 
company. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 53-58 (1988); Rendell-Baker, 451 U.S. at 842; see 
also Charles W. Thomas & Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Implications of 42U.S.C.§1983 for 
the Privatization of Prisons, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. RE.v. 933, 941-46 (1989) (arguing that the 
delegation of core government functions does not immunize the state from liability based 
upon the delegee's performance of the task). 
86. See, e.g., Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 979-80 (1995) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning the precedential value of Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)). 
87. See Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621. 
88. 500 U.S. at 621. 
89. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
90. See 365 U.S. at 716-17. 
91. 365 U.S. at 725. 
92. See 365 U.S. at 722-25; see also Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 590-94 (D.C. 
Cir.), modified on other grounds, 712 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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c. The Nexus or Compulsion Test. The Supreme Court has held 
that a private party is a state actor if the private party's actions are 
encouraged or substantially facilitated by the government.93 When 
deciding whether the government is ultimately responsible for pri-
vate discrimination, a court must "assess the potential impact of of-
ficial action [to] determin[e] whether the State has significantly 
involved itself with invidious discriminations. "94 If a state policy 
"significantly encourage[s] and involve[s] the State in private dis-
criminations," a private party's discriminatory behavior may be at-
tributed to the State's policy, thereby subjecting the behavior to 
constitutional scrutiny.9s 
Thus, if the state either requires or invites private parties to en-
gage in behavior that the state could not itself undertake, the pri-
vate party's actions may constitute state action.96 The potential 
utility of this test is perhaps greatest in cases raising procedural due 
process claims.97 This is so because a private employer has no obli-
gation to provide such process,98 and there is no underlying state 
law mandating or even encouraging specific procedural rights to 
93. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
94. 387 U.S. at 380. 
95. 387 U.S. at 381; see also Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 818-21 
(D.C. Cir. 1993), revel in part, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 
3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 95-124); Franz, 707 F.2d at 592 n.38. 
96. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 380-81; see also Alliance for Community Media, 10 F.3d at 
817-21 (finding state action where the government encouraged private actors to ban indecent 
material on public access television channels). In many cases, the nexus test may serve as 
little more than a complicated means of describing what is essentially a direct challenge to a 
state or federal statute; the private party's behavior has constitutional significance only by 
virtue of some positive law. It is this positive law and not the private party's behavior that 
justifies the application of constitutional norms. See, e.g., Alliance for Community Media, 10 
F.3d at 817-21. Alliance for Community Media could arguably be characterized as a direct 
challenge to the validity of a federal statute that invites cable programmers to ban "indecent" 
programming. Indeed, Judge Wald conceded as much in her dissent from the en bane court's 
decision reversing certain aspects of the panel's opinion. See Alliance for Community Media, 
56 F.3d at 130-34 (Wald, J., dissenting). Conceptually, this approach may make more sense 
than the alternative, which requires complicated mental gymnastics. In cases raising proce-
dural due process claims, however, the government's ability to oversee or supervise a private 
entity's personnel or membership decisions could obligate the party to observe procedural 
due process by virtue of the government's oversight activities. See, e.g., Coleman v. Wagner 
College, 429 F.2d 1120, 1123-25 (2d Cir. 1970); Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 
385 F. Supp. 473, 487-90, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1974). In such cases, the nexus test functions inde-
pendently because no state or federal law is at issue. The question is more basic: Is the 
private entity essentially functioning as an agent of the state, thereby executing a state pro-
gram or policy? 
97. See, e.g., Coleman, 429 F.2d at 1123-25. 
98. Government employees generally enjoy a constitutionally protected interest in not 
being denied continued employment because of their exercise of constitutional rights. See 
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 
U.S. 532, 538-40 (1985) (finding a state law property right in continued employment). But 
see Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-77 (1972) (holding that a 
professor appointed to a one-year term pursuant to a contract did not enjoy a legitimate 
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govern a private employer's particular employment practices. Ac-
cordingly, an employee working for a private employer may claim 
the benefit of pre-termination process as a matter of right only if 
the government can somehow be deemed responsible for the pri-
vate employer's termination decision. The nexus test often pro-
vides the best means of establishing such responsibility. 
C. Putting It All Together 
The state action doctrine as currently constructed requires 
courts to engage in a three-step process. First, the court must deter-
mine whether the defendant is an agent of the govemment.99 If 
not, the Court must then determine whether the claim effectively 
raises a challenge to a positive state or federal law.10° Finally, if the 
case does not challenge the validity of a state or federal law but 
rather the enforcement of a private preference through an admit-
tedly valid state or federal law, the court must engage in contacts 
analysis.101 
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
A great deal of scholarly energy has been devoted to pointing 
out the shortcomings of the state action doctrine,102 and it would be 
both impossible and unproductive to catalOg all of these efforts. A 
expectation of continued employment and therefore did not enjoy a protected property inter-
est in his job). 
99. See supra section I.A; see also Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 
961, 964 (1995). 
100. See supra section I.B.1; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) 
(holding that a challenge to a jury verdict based on Alabama's common law of libel impli-
cated a policy of the state, satisfying the state action requirement); Wiiiiam W. Van Alstyne, 
Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DuKE LJ. 
219, 229-30 (describing and criticizing the Court's brief, almost casual analysis in the New 
York Times case). 
101. See supra section I.B.2. For example, if David Duke relies upon Georgia's common 
law of trespass to enforce his decision not to permit minorities to walk across his property, 
the underlying law - the common law of trespass - is undeniably constitutional. What is at 
issue is whether Mr. Duke could rely upon the local police to eject the trespassers and-or 
recover money damages from the minorities who trod upon his property without his consent, 
if the reason he wishes to exclude them from his property rests on racial prejudice. Cf. 
Wechsler, supra note 71, at 29-30 ("May not the state employ its law to vindicate the privacy 
of property against a trespasser, regardless of the grounds of his exclusion, or does it embrace 
the owner's reasons for excluding if it buttresses his power by the law?"). In such circum-
stances, Mr. Duke's preference must be attributable to the state for the minority defendants 
to raise the Equal Protection Clause as a defense in a criminal prosecution or a civil lawsuit. 
102. See, e.g., Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and the Allocation 
of Responsibility for Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1053, 1053 n.1 
(1990) (collecting sources); see also Black, supra note 13, at 97-109; Chemerinsky, supra note 
13, at 503-07; Van Alstyne, supra note 100, at 245-47; Wiiiiam W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. 
Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 3-5, 57-58 (1961); Wechsler, supra note 71, at 29-34. 
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brief overview of the scholarship in this area, however, will illus-
trate the principal objections to the doctrine as it presently exists. 
Legal scholarship about the state action doctrine has been a 
feast or famine affair. In the not-so-distant past, the state action 
problem was a prime focus of scholarly efforts as the legal academy 
tried to understand and make sense of the Supreme Court's analyti-
cal gyrations; there was a plethora of writings about state action in 
the 1960s. Scholarly interest in the topic has waned since then, 
however, not because the problem has gone away, but because 
many academics lost interest in trying to bring order to the morass 
of tests, holdings, and approaches that have emanated from the 
Supreme Court.103 
Oddly, however, contemporary scholarship about the state ac-
tion doctrine has been as extreme as it is rare. Some of the most 
recent scholarly proposals either advocate abandoning the state ac-
tion doctrine completely, in favor of some form of rights balanc-
ing104 or suggest state action tests that would effectively transform 
almost all private behavior into state action.10s On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court has not indicated any significant interest in sub-
stantially revising its state action jurisprudence. The virtuous mean 
between the two extremes106 lies neither in abandoning the quest 
for consistent and intuitively rational state action determinations 
nor in slavishly hewing to the existing precedents without regard to 
the absurd results that flow from their formalistic application.101 
103. See Snyder, supra note 102, at 1053-57. Indeed, only a handful of articles about the 
state action doctrine have appeared in the 1990s. This may well reflect the creation of civil 
law analogs to the Equal Protection Clause, for example, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 
No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended principally at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. 
L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). Be-
cause most employees enjoy statutory protection from discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, and religion, there is correspondingly less of a need to puzzle over whether a particular 
employer's actions reasonably could be attributed to the government. 
104. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 503-07, 524-27, 535-57. In fairness, over the 
course of the past thirty years, a number of commentators have advocated the abolition of 
the state action requirement. See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Func-
tional Analysis of the Founeenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 
221, 226-27, 254-55, 259, 261. 
105. See Snyder, supra note 102, at 1056-57, 1063-65, 1075-76, 1086; Jerre S. Williams, 
The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347, 367 (1963). 
106. See THE N1coMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE, bk. II, ch. VI-10 (R.W. Browne 
trans., London, George Bell & Sons 1880) ("Virtue .•• is a mean state between two vices, one 
in excess, the other in defect; and it is so, moreover, because of the vices one division falls 
short of, and the other exceeds what is right, both in passions and actions, whilst virtue dis-
covers the mean and chooses it."). 
107. See, e.g., Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 113 (D.C. Cir.) (hold-
ing that cable television companies are not state actors for purposes of applying the First 
Amendment even though statutorily authorized to restrict the content of programming), peti-
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Scholarly criticism of the state action doctrine reflects a com-
mon belief, strongly held by some, ios that the current state action 
doctrine unfairly insulates unlawful behavior from judicial re-
view .109 A second and perhaps equally compelling criticism is the 
tion for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 95-124); Lebron v. National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that Amtrak is not a state actor for 
purposes of applying the First Amendment), revel., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995); Yeager v. City of 
McGregor, 980 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state-supported volunteer fire com-
pany was not a state actor for purposes of applying the First Amendment). 
108. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 550-57. 
109. Critics of the state action doctrine argue that it does not significantly protect individ-
ual autonomy values because the person discriminated against has an interest in the "consti-
tutional value" of equal treatment. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 509-11, 536-42; Kevin 
Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doc-
trine, 24 GA. L. REv. 327, 354-55 (1990). This argument largely ignores the fundamental 
nature of the relationship between the governed and the government. In the United States, 
government is the agent of the citizenry and not vice-versa. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 24, at 
1205-12. To attribute private behavior to the government on a theory that the government 
failed to prohibit it puts the cart before the horse; in our private relations, we have a right to 
expect - if not demand - a sphere of autonomy. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (upholding the right of marital privacy); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (upholding the right to "direct the upbringing and education of [one's] children"); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding the right to teach the German language). 
To say that a failure to regulate a particular area of private behavior is government action is 
to say that the government is the principal and the citizenry its agent. Cf. JoHN LocKE, 
Second Treatise, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, ch. Vil, §§ 87-89, at 366-69 (Peter 
Laslett ed., 1965) (explaining that individuals, existing prior to the state, come together to 
create a government that will exercise only those powers that the individuals cede to it; 
Locke places the individual prior to the state and plainly makes the state the agent of those 
who create it). Thus, government's failure to prohibit all forms of private discrimination and 
its willingness to create and enforce neutral laws protecting life, liberty, and property, such as 
the law of trespass, or its inability to adopt and enforce speech codes, see American Booksell-
ers' Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affd. mem, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), does no 
violence to "constitutional values," although the private behavior at issue may well be unfair, 
unjust, or completely immoral. Only when the state encourages or endorses unconstitutional 
practices is a constitutional interest present because the individual is prior to the state. 
Direct rights balancing, as Chemerinsky advocates, presupposes the primacy of the state 
over the individual. This is a proposition that I reject and a proposition that the Supreme 
Court has specifically declined to endorse. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dept. 
of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-97 (1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause "confer[s] 
no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individ-
ual"); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (invalidating on First and Fourteenth 
Amendment grounds the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member for advocating violence as a 
means of effecting political change). Government may - and sometimes must - remain 
"neutral" in disputes over the fairness or justice of personal decisions. For example, a voter 
who refuses to support candidates for public office who are not members of his race is dis-
criminating on the basis of race and could well be responsible for a minority candidate's 
defeat in an election for public office. Cf. Kenneth J. Cooper, House Task Force Refuses to 
Dismiss Election Case, WASH. PosT, Mar. 24, 1995, at Al (reporting on an election for a 
House seat decided by only twenty-one votes). The state provided the ballot and did not 
prohibit the voter from exercising his vote in a racially discriminatory fashion. I would argue 
that the minority candidate has not suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right that must 
be balanced against the voter's interest in exercising his ballot for such reasons as he deems 
fit and proper. This is so because voting is an area in which the state must remain neutral, 
enforcing the preferenC:es of individual voters without regard to whether the state itself could 
hold those preferences. See Henkin, supra note 72, at 490-91 & n.39, 498 ("Since the state 
cannot prevent the discrimination, it is not responsible for it."). 
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apparent lack of consistency in the application of the doctrine.110 
By examining the shortcomings of the state action doctrine 
through the prism of concrete cases, one can both better identify 
the particular shortcomings that have led so many to question the 
utility of the state action doctrine and propose a revised framewo,rk 
for making state action determinations that might overcome or 
lessen the effect of these shortcomings. 
A. Riding With the Lord: The Lebron Redux 
Imagine the consternation of many, if not most, of the passen-
gers on an Amtrak metroliner train if the engineer, before pulling 
out of Union Station in Washington, D.C., announced over the in-
tercom, "Let's all bow our heads before we begin our trip .... You 
should know that Jesus will be our co-pilot!" Such a blatantly sec-
tarian message in the context of. secular travel aboard a govern-
ment-subsidized train would be jarring, to say the least. Yet, if 
Amtrak is not a state actor, it is free of the constraints of the First 
Amendment, including the Establishment Clause, and can take po-
sitions on matters of faith in its place of business, just like any cab 
driver or hamburger stand owner.111 
Under the Court's traditional contacts analysis tests, Amtrak 
probably would not qualify as a state actor.112 A mechanical appli-
cation of the exclusive government function, symbiotic relationship, 
and nexus tests leads, perhaps inexorably, to the conclusion that 
Amtrak is not a state actor. In Lebron, the Supreme Court deftly 
avoided the application of its contacts analysis state action tests 
simply by recasting the question presented for review. Had the 
Court applied these tests, however, the Second Circuit's decision 
would probably have been affirmed.113 
Although there has been a long tradition of government support 
110. See, e.g., Glennon & Nowak, supra note 104, at 221-22; VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 
11, at 12-15. Compare Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 21-25 (2d 
Cir. 1979) with Yeager, 980 F.2d at 339-43. 
111. See, e.g., Dan McGraw, The Christian Capitalists, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 
13, 1995, at 53 (reporting on the growth of private businesses with religious agendas). 
112. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 979-81 {1995) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-92 (2d 
Cir. 1993), revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 {1995). 
113. Justice O'Connor's dissent in Lebron demonstrates this point quite effectively. 115 
S. Ct. at 979-81. Of course, the Supreme Court did find that Amtrak was a state actor, based 
on its conclusion that Amtrak is part of the federal government. 115 S. Ct. at 972-75. That 
the Court found it necessary to abandon its traditional state action tests in favor of a more 
intuitive taxonomy is quite telling. 
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of passenger and cargo rail service,114 passenger rail service in the 
United States cannot be fairly characterized as an "exclusive gov-
ernment function."115 Unlike police, fire, and sanitation services,116 
the government has not historically shouldered primary responsibil-
ity for the provision of railroad transportation. 
Turning to the nexus test, one finds that Amtrak receives federal 
funds and is subject to federal statutory and regulatory obligations. 
The level of funding and the degree of regulation, however, are 
probably not sufficient to satisfy Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison.117 
The regulations are far from pervasive, and the federal govern-
ment's funding constitutes but a portion of Amtrak's total 
receipts. us 
The "symbiotic relationship" test supports the strongest argu-
ment one can make for treating Amtrak as a state actor under the 
Court's pre-Lebron state action jurisprudence.119 The federal gov-
ernment's relationship to Amtrak could be characterized as interde-
pendent, with corporate officials regularly answering to federal 
officials, including the Congress, about their business decisions.120 
At least arguably, the federal government has "so far insinuated 
114. The federal and state governments provided both direct and indirect subsidies to 
railroads to facilitate the building of a national rail system. See CARTER GooDRICH, Gov. 
ERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS 1800-1890 (1960); WALTER 
LICI-IT, WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD 8-9 (1983); LLOYD J. MERCER, RAILROADS AND 
LAND GRANT POLICY: A STUDY IN GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION (1982); see also Paul 
Dempsey, Rate Regulation and Antitrust Immunity in Transportation: The Genesis and 
Evolution of an Endangered Species, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 335, 337 (1983) ("The growth, devel-
opment, and expansion of the rail system into the midwest and western United States in the 
nineteenth century were for the most part attributable to governments and individual inves-
tors."); cf. JAMES D. Cox ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION 1333 n.1 (1991) ("[M]ost of the 
capital used to fund last century's railroad expansion in the United States came from bonds 
floated in Europe .... "). Ownership and operation of the railroads, however, has almost 
always been vested in nongovernmental entities. The same tradition does not hold true in 
other parts of the world, including Western Europe and Asia. See Dempsey, supra, at 336. 
115. Cf. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149. 161-63 (1978). 
116. See 436 U.S. at 163. 
117. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In this case, the Supreme Court held that a privately owned 
and operated utility company was not a state actor despite its monopoly status and the heavy 
governmental regulation of most utility companies. 419 U.S. at 349-51. 
118. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-701.8 (1994) (setting forth the Department of Transporta-
tion's regulations pertaining specifically to Amtrak, which comprises only 9 pages, most of 
which addresses how Amtrak must process FOIA requests); Prepared Statement of Thomas 
Downs, Chairman and President of Amtrak, Before the House Committee on Transportation 
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, Federal News Service, Feb. 7, 1995, available 
in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File; GAO, INTERCITY PASSENGER RAIL - FINANCIAL 
AND OPERATING CoNDmoNs THREATEN AMTRAK'S LoNG-TERM VIABILITY, Feb. 7, 1995, 
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, GAORPT File. 
119. See Burton v. Wtlmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
120. See, e.g., Don Phillips, Hill Auditors Say Amtrak Needs Infusion of Capital, WASH. 
PoST, Feb. 8, 1995, at Cl (reporting on the congressional oversight of Amtrak's short- and 
long-term business plans). 
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itself into a position of interdependence with" Amtrak that it really 
is "a joint participant" in the business venture.121 
Both Justice O'Connor - dissenting in Lebron - and the Sec-
ond Circuit, however, found that Amtrak and the federal govern-
ment were not in a symbiotic relationship.122 Justice O'Connor 
reasoned that because a member of Amtrak's management was di-
rectly responsible for the alleged deprivation of Lebron's First 
Amendment rights, the act could not be attributed to the govern-
ment.123 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, simply deferred to 
Congress's designation of Amtrak as a "nongovernmental" en-
tity.124 Regardless of the precise reasoning employed, under the 
Court's pre-Lebron state action jurisprudence, it is possible - and 
perhaps probable - for an entity such as Amtrak to escape respon-
sibility for observing the constitutional rights of its employees and 
customers. 
The point is not a minor one: the Lebron decision does not ap-
ply to cases in which the defendant is not arguably a component of 
the government itself. In cases involving more than nominally pri-
vate defendants, lower federal courts must continue to apply the 
three traditional contacts analysis state action tests. 
Nor was the Second Circuit's treatment and Justice O'Connor's 
proposed treatment of Amtrak anomalous. The Supreme Court's 
pre-Lebron state action jurisprudence, coupled with the lower fed-
eral courts' eagerness to permit the government to shed the mantle 
of sovereignty by legislative fiat, led to a raft of rather unconvincing 
opinions that rely entirely on formalistic analyses to avoid holding 
government-sponsored and controlled corporations accountable for 
observing constitutional norms. Indeed, the federal courts have 
demonstrated an amazing consistency in holding that government-
controlled corporations are not state actors under the traditional 
state action tests. Trme and again, federally chartered and con-
trolled corporate entities have escaped constitutional liabilities on 
the theory that the sovereign is free to act as a private entity and 
need only declare an entity "nongovernmental" to achieve this ob-
jective, notwithstanding the fundamentally public character of the 
corporation's existence. 
121. Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. 
122. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 979-80 (1995) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-92 (2d 
Cir. 1993). 
123. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 980. 
124. See Lebron, 12 F.3d at 390-91. 
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In addition to Amtrak, federal courts have found the Corpora-
tion for Public Broadcasting (CPB),125 the Legal Services Corpora-
tion (LSC),126 and the Government National Mortgage 
Corporation (GNMA)127 to be "private" entities for purposes of 
imposing constitutional obligations. The CPB, however, to take 
one example, exists solely to administer federally funded grants to 
support educational television stations and programming, and is 
functionally little different from the National Endowment for the 
Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities. To take a 
second example, one cannot seriously question the public character 
of the LSC.128 
Plainly, Amtrak, the CPB, the LSC, the GNMA, and similar en-
tities represent constituent components of the federal government, 
notwithstanding Congress's declaration to the contrary. Indeed, 
Lebron casts serious doubt on the continuing validity of decisions 
that reach a contrary result. The majority's decision should effec-
tively preclude governmental entities from shirking their constitu-
tional duties by delegating the implementation of public functions 
to ostensibly "private" government-controlled entities.129 
As noted above, however, Lebron does not affect the ability of 
the government to implement policies through truly private entities. 
Lebron's formal reach is limited to entities in which the government 
maintains both a substantial equity position and de jure control.130 
Accordingly, although Lebron represents a major shift in the 
Court's state action jurisprudence, the traditional state action tests 
remain valid and will continue to govern state action analyses in 
125. See Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
2399, 2403-08 (D.D.C. 1979). 
126. See Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 541-42 (D.D.C. 1986). New-
man has been effectively overruled. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 
940 F.2d 685, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
127. See Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 1232-35 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 {1980); see also Jackson v. Culinary Sch. of Wash., 788 F. Supp. 
1233, 1265 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that the Federal Student Loan Guaranty Association -
"Sallie Mae" - is "not a governmental entity" because Congress designated the corporation 
"private"). 
128. Of course, the act of representing a defendant in a criminal proceeding does not 
constitute state action. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-19 (1981). 
129. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 972-75 (1995). But see 
Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 118 n.10 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. 
filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 21, 1995) (No. 95-124). 
130. See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 973-75. The Lebron majority did not specify the precise 
degree of control necessary for its holding to apply. Thus, it is not clear whether mere de 
facto control, as opposed to de jure control, would be sufficient to invoke successfully the 
Lebron rule. 
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cases in which the defendant is more than nominally private.131 Be-
cause the traditional state action tests, as applied, have failed to 
ferret out routinely and consistently actions "fairly attributable to 
the government," reform of the state action doctrine remains some-
thing of a work in progress. 
B. Catching Local Fire Companies in a Dysfunctional Net 
Tue current state action doctrine can be conceptualized as a 
fishing net with very wide holes, at least insofar as it applies to the 
behavior of more-than-nominally private entities.132 Although the 
tests are capable of catching the biggest fish, many small- and 
medium-sized fish routinely slip through unhindered. Given the 
government's relationship with Amtrak, it is difficult to fathom a 
better example of a "private" entity that should be deemed a state 
actor. Yet, for over two decades, every lower federal court to con-
sider the question concluded that Amtrak was not a state actor.133 
Lebron now undermines the flawed reasoning that led courts to 
declare entities like Amtrak, the CPB, and the LSC to be free of 
constitutional obligations. Other similarly troubling results, how-
ever, are unaffected by the Lebron decision. Tue traditional state 
action tests - which the Supreme Court majority avoided applying 
in Lebron - are alive and well and, because they are often applied 
formalistically, will continue to work serious mischief. 
Federal courts' treatment of the constitutional status of volun-
teer fire companies provides an excellent example of the shortcom-
ings of the current state action doctrine because fire companies 
execute a quintessential "public" service that historically has not 
been an "exclusive" state function, they usually labor under state 
laws and some regulations, and they enjoy public financial support. 
131. See, e.g., Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 818-22 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), revd. in part, 56 F.3d 105 (D.C. Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S. July 
21, 1995) (No. 95-124); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 590-94 (D.C. Cir.), modified on 
other grounds, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
132. The Supreme Court's decision in Lebron does not alter the constitutional status of 
entities not subject to the control of the government through stock ownership or similar 
direct or indirect means, in other words, "private" entities. Lebron holds only that a 
government-chartered, owned, and controlled corporation executing a public policy is an in-
strumentality of the government See Lebron, 115 S. Ct. at 972-75. 
133. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 391-92 (2d Cir. 1993), 
revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995); Andersen v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 754 F.2d 202, 204-05 
(7th Cir. 1984); Wilson v. Amtrak Natl. R.R. Corp., 824 F. Supp. 55, 57-58 (D. Md. 1992); 
Railway Labor Executives' Assn. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1516, 1524 
n.11 (D.D.C. 1988); Marcucci v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 589 F. Supp. 725, 727-29 
(N.D. Ill. 1984); Kimbrough v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 549 F. Supp. 169, 172-73 
(M.D. Ala. 1982). 
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Similar entities include libraries, hospitals, and primary and secon-
dary schools. The treatment of volunteer fire companies provides 
meaningful guidance about the state-actor status of nominally pri-
vate entities providing these public services. 
Leading the charge, the Fifth Circuit, _applying the Supreme 
Court's traditional contacts-based state action tests, has held that a 
volunteer fire company is not a state actor. Most people - includ-
ing the Chief Justice - view fire protection as an essential public 
service.134 In order to satisfy the Supreme Court's state action re-
quirement, however, fire protection must not be an "essential" pub-
lic service but rather an "exclusive government function."135 That 
is to say, the historical provision of a particular service by private 
parties will preclude a finding of state action under the exclusive 
government function test, even if government would have to pro-
vide the service in the absence of private companies. 
In an opinion written by Judge Edith Jones, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the McGregor Volunteer Fire Department was not a state 
actor, and it therefore had no obligation to respect the First 
Amendment rights of its members.136 Applying the three state ac-
tion tests seriatim, the Court held that the fire company did not 
satisfy any one of the tests completely.137 
The court conceded that local governments often provide fire 
protection service but noted that, in some jurisdictions, private 
companies have assumed this duty.138 Moreover, the existence of 
134. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978); see also Meet the Press 
(NBC television broadcast, Mar. 12, 1995) (Remarks of Senator Phil Gramm) {"If my house 
had caught on fire last night, I would have called the fire department ...• It's the govern-
ment .... Government is an important part of our lives."). 
135. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). 
136. See Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 339-43 (5th Cir. 1993). Of course, 
Judge Jones has established a national reputation for her conservative jurisprudence. One 
cannot, however, simply dismiss the Yeager court's holding as an anomaly. See Groman v. 
Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 641 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[W]e find the court's analysis in 
Yeager more persuasive than the court's [analysis] in Janusaitis and more consonant with 
controlling precedent, although we do not explicitly adopt the analysis in Yeager."); see also 
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 856 F. Supp. 966, 972-76 {E.D. Pa. 1994) (following, for the 
most part, the Yeager court's analysis and finding that a volunteer fire company was not a 
state actor), affd. on other grounds, 51F.3d1137 (3d Cir. 1995) (overruling the district court's 
holding that the fire company was not a state actor but affirming on other grounds). On the 
other hand, the contemporary state action doctrine does not compel the result in Yeager; it 
merely permits it. Thus, it is not surprising that a panel of the Third Circuit has held that 
firefighting was an "exclusive government function" under Pennsylvania state law. See Mark, 
51 F.3d at 1144-48. Along the way, the court severely criticized the Yeager decision and the 
quality of Judge Jones's reasoning. See 51 F.3d at 1147 n.11. 
137. Yeager, 980 F.2d at 339-43. 
138. 980 F.2d at 341. But see Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 746 (3d Cir. 
1978) ("Nor can evasions of state governmental responsibilities be permitted to tum on the 
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state regulations and :financial support, considered alone, was insuf-
ficient to establish a symbiotic relationship between the City of 
McGregor and the fire company.139 Finally, there was no evidence 
that the City of McGregor or the State of Texas encouraged or facil-
itated the fire department's behavior. 
Significantly, the Yeager court made no effort to consider the 
governmental nature of the fire protection services, the existence of 
state regulations, and the state subsidies in tandem. At no point did 
the court step back and examine the forest; instead, its analysis 
went from tree to tree. 
This kind of constitutional myopia is not uncommon. In Haavis-
tola v. Community Fire Company, 140 a case with substantially simi-
lar facts, a federal district judge reached the same result and used 
like reasoning. In that case, the court considered - and rejected 
- five separate theories of state action potentially applicable to the 
fire company.141 In consequence, the court held that the volunteer 
fire company was free to practice gender-based discrimination 
against female firefighters. Had the court considered the various 
connections between the state of Maryland and the fire company 
conjunctively, rather than singly and in insolation, the court could 
have reached a different conclusion.142 
The Yeager and Haavistola courts rigidly applied the particular 
formulations of state action handed down by the Supreme Court, 
but they failed to honor the Court's admonition that reviewing 
fact that the instrumentality to whom the responsibility has been delegated once operated, in 
the dim and distant past, as a private institution."). 
139. Yeager, 980 F.2d at 342-43. 
140. 812 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Md.), revd., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). 
141. See 812 F. Supp. at 1392-99. In a bizarre opinion, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court's entry of summary judgment. See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 
211 (4th Cir. 1993). Noting that "[t]he district court's analysis is flawed in that it draws fac-
tual conclusions inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment," the Fourth Circuit held 
that the legal status of the fire company was a factual question to be decided by a jury. 6 F.3d 
at 218-19. But see Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting 
the claim that summary judgment was premature "because the material facts were undis-
puted" and resolving the state action question as one of law). The absurdity of this position 
was later recognized by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, who correctly observed that under the 
court's holding, different juries could decide the state action question differently for the same 
entity. See Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., No. 93-1610, 1994 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 12492, at *6-*12 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (4th Cir. May 31, 1994). The problem, of 
course, is that the Fourth Circuit goofed in Haavistola: although the subsidiary facts neces-
sary to determine whether the Rising Sun fire company was a state actor were within the 
province of the jury, the legal significance of those facts was a question of law, appropriately 
reserved to the court. Because the parties in Haavistola did not dispute any of the subsidiary 
questions of fact, there was no role for the jury in determining whether the fire company was 
a state actor. 
142. See, e.g., Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 21-25 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
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courts must "sift[] facts and weigh[ ] circumstances"143 in order to 
"determine whether the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
tends to a particular case."144 This approach resulted in decisions 
that simply do not reflect a basic reality: citizens expect their gov-
ernment to protect them from the danger of fire.14s 
Firefighters provide a service that is as closely and traditionally 
associated with state and local governments as the services pro-
vided by police officers, judges, tax collectors, and prison offi-
cials.146 To be sure, firefighting once was an activity conducted by 
private organizations that were largely, if not completely, unregu-
lated by state or local governments.147 Firefighting, however, long 
ago evolved from a poorly organized, ad hoc affair of citizens with 
leather buckets into a government-sponsored, government-
regulated service, with the states conferring plenary powers of entry 
and arrest on firefighters to ensure the safety of lives and 
property.14s 
The importance of the legal status of a volunteer fire depart-
ment cannot be underestimated. For example, a volunteer 
firefighter's ability to exercise her First Amendment rights could 
prove crucial to the safety and welfare of a community. If a com-
pany is not properly trained, is using outdated equipment, or lacks 
143. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
144. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1966). 
145. See, e.g., Meet the Press, supra note 134 (providing an example of support for this 
popular expectation from a most unlikely source: Senator Phil Gramm). 
146. Some cities, however, choose to contract out the responsibility for providing fire 
protection. See MALCOLM GETZ, THE ECONOMICS OF THE URBAN FIRE DEPARTMENT 11 
(1979). Even in those instances where a municipality elects to contract for fire protection 
services, however, it must retain substantial control over the contractor. Id. at 12. Further-
more, even if a city contracts out responsibility for firefighting to a private company, the 
character of the service would render the private company a state actor because it would be 
performing a state function. See Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates' Rights and Privatiza-
tion of Prisons, 86 CoLUM. L. R:Ev. 1475, 1501 (1986) ("Private entities entrusted to perform 
public functions are the 'functional equivalent' of state agencies."); see also Ancata v. Prison 
Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Where a function which is tradition-
ally the exclusive prerogative of the state ... is performed by a private entity, state action is 
present"). 
147. The first volunteer fire company in the United States was organized in 1736. See 
DEAN SMrnr's HISTORY OF FIREFIGHTING IN AMERICA: 300 YEARS OF COURAGE 12-13 
(1978). Early volunteer fire companies existed primarily in urban centers. See id. at 12, 28-
29. Members financed company operations through assessments on the members and fines 
for violations of company rules and provided their own personal equipment, including buck-
ets, bags, and baskets. Id. at 12-13, 28-29. In 1853, Cincinnati established the first paid fire 
department in the United States. Id. at 57-59; see also HERBERT THEODORE JENNESS, FROM 
BUCKET BRIGADE TO FLYING SQUADRON 146 (1909) (noting the replacement of the volun-
teer fire companies in U.S. cities with municipal fire departments). These urban volunteer 
groups have long since been replaced by paid professional fire departments. 
148. See SMrnr, supra note 147, at 61. 
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adequate staffing, the community needs to know about it. In the 
context of public employment, the Supreme Court has recognized a 
free-speech easement in government workplaces to facilitate speech 
concerning matters of public concem.149 Volunteer firefighters sub-
ject to summary discharge or other forms of punishment will think 
twice before speaking out about problems with the local fire 
company. 
The logic of these arguments has not been entirely lost on the 
federal judiciary. The Second Circuit, applying the exclusive gov-
ernment function and symbiotic relationship tests in tandem, held 
in Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department150 that volun-
teer fire companies in Connecticut were state actors for purposes of 
applying the First Amendment, explaining that "the function of fire 
protection is sufficiently 'associated with sovereignty' " to justify a 
finding of state action.151 The court observed that "[t]here are few 
governmental interests more compelling than that of protection 
from fire" and also noted that Connecticut law vested volunteer 
firefighters with "certain powers traditionally associated with 
sovereignty."152 
The Fifth Circuit disregarded Janusaitis in Yeager, deeming the 
decision "archai[c],"153 whereas the district court in Haavistola dis-
tinguished the case on factual grounds.154 Neither court recognized 
the real significance of Janusaitis, which was the Second Circuit's 
comprehensive approach to the state action question.155 Instead of 
mechanically going through the motions of a state action analysis, 
the court in Janusaitis carefully weighed the facts in order to make 
an accurate state action determination. 
149. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (seeking to strike "'a balance be-
tween the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees' " (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968))). 
150. 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979). 
151. 607 F.2d at 23-24 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 
(1974)). 
152. 607 F.2d at 23-24. 
153. Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1993). 
154. See Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 812 F. Supp. 1379, 1398 & n.22 (D. Md.), 
revd., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993). 
155. Indeed, Judge Jones implied that the Second Circuit's reliance on multiple state ac-
tion tests was evidence that the decision was not theoretically sound. Yeager, 980 F.2d at 341-
42. 
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C. State Action Doctrine as a Playschool Cobbler's Bench 
Almost every child is familiar with the "Cobbler's Bench," a 
shape-learning toy featuring a mallet, a small wooden "cobbler's 
bench," and brightly colored plastic shapes, including a circle, a 
square, and a triangle. The state action doctrine, as currently prac-
ticed, is something of a Cobbler's Bench: when presented with the 
need to make a state action determination, the federal courts com-
pare the facts of a particular case, the shape, to each of the three 
state action tests, the holes. If the shape fits into one of the holes, 
the state action requirement is satisfied. If the shape does not fit 
exactly into one of the holes, however, courts too often conclude 
that state action is absent. 
Courts do not know what to make of parabolas and trapezoids; 
in consequence, the federal courts disregard essential facts when 
applying a particular state action test, even though it may not be 
possible to make an accurate assessment of the entity's constitu-
tional status without consideration of all potentially relevant factors 
conjunctively.156 Judges, like frustrated young cobblers, need the 
flexibility to create openings that accommodate a variety of shapes. 
Instead of using the Supreme Court's shorthands as analytical 
guideposts - which is all the various state action formulations are 
and all the Supreme Court has ever purported them to be - the 
lower federal courts have treated the state action tests as hard-and-
fast limitations on the liability of ostensibly private entities for con-
stitutional violations. If any one of the tests does not perfectly de-
scribe a particular person or entity, that person or entity is not a 
state actor, even if it has characteristics that meet some aspect of 
each of the tests.1s1 In consequence, unconstitutional behavior that 
has its genesis with the government goes unremedied. 
Ironically, the Supreme Court's attempt to provide the lower 
federal courts with guidance on making state action determinations 
- an inquiry that it has described as essentially "fact based" and 
requiring consideration of "nonobvious" factors - has devolved 
into a mechanical, formalistic application of the state action tests. 
The net effect of the Supreme Court's guid?nce has been to reduce 
156. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-44 (1982); Lebron v. National 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1993), revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995); Lubin 
v. Crittendon Hosp. Assn., 713 F.2d 414, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1983); Warren v. Government Natl. 
Mortgage Assn., 611 F.2d 1229, 1233-35 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Northrip 
v. Federal Natl. Mortgage Assn., 527 F2d 23, 30-31 (6th Cir. 1975); Haavistola, 812 F. Supp. 
at 1392-99. But see Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1979). 
157. See, e.g., Haavistola, 812 F. Supp. at 1379. 
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the quality of the reasoning exhibited in the lower federal courts' 
state action determinations, 158 enabling the lower federal courts to 
avoid an approach that would require them to explore and explain 
the specific context in which claims of state action arise. 
To be sure, there is an inherent tension between the creation 
and use of judicial shorthands in the quest for equal treatment and 
the need for judges to have the flexibility to exercise discretion to 
fit legal rules to the facts of particular cases.159 Plainly, the state 
action doctrine reflects the assumption that reliance on structured 
rules will result in less arbitrary results than the alternative ap-
proach: directed, but largely unfettered, judicial discretion. 
Constitutional law, however, is not Euclidean geometry: it is an 
exercise in persuasion, not mathematical proof.16° As Professor 
Wechsler put it, "[t]he virtue or demerit of a judgment turns ... 
entirely on the reasons that support it and their adequacy to main-
tain any choice of values it decrees" and on its ability "to maintain 
the rejection of a claim that any [other] given choice should be 
decreed. "161 
The contemporary state action doctrine too easily permits 
courts to avoid responsibility for making and explaining individual-
ized state action determinations regarding the culpability of the 
government for constitutional wrongs committed by private enti-
ties. As such, it must either be abandoned or reformed. Because 
the proposals put forth for abandoning the doctrine would have sig-
nificant, negative consequences on the freedom of private action, 162 
158. See, e.g., Lebron, 12 F.3d at 390-93; Yeager, 980 F.2d at 340-42; Wolotsky v. Huhn, 
960 F.2d 1331, 1334-37 (6th Cir. 1992); Rodriguez-Garcia v. Davila, 904 F.2d 90, 96-99 (1st 
Cir. 1990); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 314-17 (6th Cir. 1988). 
159. This problem is something of a constant with any attempt systematically to treat like 
cases in like ways, such as the federal sentencing guidelines. See Charles T. Ogletree, Jr., The 
Death of Discretion?: Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 
1938 {1988) (defending generally the sentencing guidelines as facilitating process without 
conferring unlimited discretion on the courts); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Process, 72 
B.U. L. REv. 1, 97 {1992) (same); Frederick S. Levin, Note, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A 
Case For Damages Measurement "Anonmie," 22 U. MrcH. J.L. REF. 303, 311-12 (1989) 
(same); cf. Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of the Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less 
Aggregation, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 901 {1991) (criticizing arbitrary results generated under the 
sentencing guidelines); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681 (1992) (same). 
160. See Wechsler, supra note 71, at 10-20 (noting that the broad clauses of the Constitu-
tion preclude exactitude in their application and that the most one can expect of courts is "a 
principled decision"). 
161. Id. at 19-20. 
162. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 533-42; Snyder, supra note 102, at 1063-64, 1086-
87. Both Chemerinsky's and Snyder's proposals would subject each and every citizen to the 
prospect of a lawsuit for inherently private behavior, behavior that itself is subject to a color-
able claim of constitutional protection. For example, suppose I decide not to invite a neigh-
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the state action doctrine must be reformed. 
ID. MAKING THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE WORK 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings associated with the state ac-
tion doctrine as it presently exists, it should not be abandoned. The 
state action doctrine preserves a sphere of individual freedom of 
action, a freedom of action that would be reduced significantly were 
the Supreme Court to jettison the doctrine in favor of some sort of 
ad hoc rights balancing.163 The state action doctrine also properly 
reflects and helps to preserve the theoretical priority of the individ-
ual over the state.164 Because the individual citizen is prior to the 
state - that is to say, the state exercises authority derived from 
individual citizens and not vice versa - the state cannot legiti-
mately be deemed responsible for a private citizen's each and every 
act.16s At the same time, government can and should be held ac-
countable for actions that it commands or encourages. The trick, of 
course, is striking the proper balance between the competing and 
conflicting goals of protecting individual liberty and requiring gov-
ernment fealty to constitutional commands. 
Even if one embraces the state action doctrine as a necessary 
theoretical construct, one can still take the position that it could be 
significantly improved. The contemporary state action doctrine un-
bor's son to my daughter's birthday party because of his race and religious beliefs, and the 
neighbor, son in tow, arrives at my home to attend the party. If, in troglodyte fashion, I 
refuse to admit either the neighbor or his son and, moreover, have recourse to the local 
police to enforce my wish that they leave my property, can the neighbor sue me for a depri-
vation of his constitutional rights? Consistent with both Chemerinsky's and Snyder's theo-
ries of state action, I could be sued and made to answer for my refusal to include my 
neighbor's son in my daughter's birthday festivities. Chemerinsky would apparently permit 
the suit without regard to the involvement of the local police. See Chemerinsky, supra note 
13, at 537-38. Snyder would first require the local police department's involvement. See 
Snyder, supra note 102, at 1094. In either case, my ability to select my social acquaintances 
would be severely circumscribed, even if I ultimately were to prevail in fending off my neigh-
bor's suit. Under these theories, countless private social and religious organizations who rely 
upon the state to enforce their property rights would be subject to litigation that would have 
a chilling effect on the exercise of those rights. 
163. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 533-42. 
164. See supra note 109; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 
(1991) ("One great object of the Constitution is to permit citizens to structure their private 
relations as they choose subject only to the constraints of statutory or decisional law."); 
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (holding that the state action doctrine" 'pre-
serves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law' and avoids the 
imposition of responsibility on a State for conduct it could not [or did not] control" (quoting 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982))); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 
455, 469-70 (1973) (noting, in dicta, that the state may but need not remain neutral in the face 
of private behavior that it could not itself support or endorse). 
165. Put differently, the state's failure to prohibit a particular course of action by an indi-
vidual citizen should not be deemed an endorsement of the particular behavior. 
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reasonably immunizes government-sponsored conduct from consti-
tutional scrutiny because federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, apply the state action tests both formalistically and in 
isolation. 
Formalism, broadly defined, is the strict application of a rule.166 
While such application serves to ensure a high degree of predict-
ability in results,167 courts can enforce rule formality too strictly, 
even to the extreme of enforcing a rule when the reasons behind 
the rule are not present.168 The federal courts' treatment of the 
exclusive government functions test provides a rich example of this 
problem.169 
The Supreme Court has also acquiesced in the lower courts' ap-
plication of each state action test in isolation.17° Thus, it is possible 
for an entity to enjoy some modicum of government control, regu-
lation, funding, and so on and to perform a service associated with 
the government but not exclusively reserved to it and still not be a 
state actor.171 In many instances, if courts applied the tests in tan-
dem, the state action requirement would be satisfied.172 
166. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO· 
AMERICAN LAW 28-31 (1987) (discussing formalistic reasoning). 
167. Id. at 28-31, 88-93, 250-51. 
168. Id. at 88-93, 108-09; cf. O.W. HoLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of 
the law has not been logic: it has been experience."); LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 189 (A 
"rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the rule."). 
169. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
170. See Rendell-Baker, 451 U.S. at 839-43; see also Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 962, 972-75 (1995) (failing to criticize either the quality or depth of the 
Second Circuit's state action analysis). For examples of lower courts applying the state action 
tests in isolation, see Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-93 (2d Cir. 
1993), revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995); Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 340-42 (5th Cir. 
1993); Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1334-37 (6th Cir. 1992); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 
F.2d 312, 314-17 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 754 F.2d 202, 
203-04 (7th Cir. 1984); Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447, 450-52 (6th Cir. 1984); and Jensen v. 
Farrell Lines, Inc., 625 F.2d 379, 384-87 (2d Cir. 1980). 
171. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1457 (10th Cir. 
1995) (holding that the acts of private security personnel at a state-owned arena cannot be 
fairly attributed to the state under any of the state action tests); Lubin v. Crittendon Hosp. 
Assn., 713 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that there was no nexus between the state's 
relationship to the operation of a private hospital that leased land and building from county 
and the disciplinary action taken by hospital against physician so as to justify attribution of 
the challenged action to the state); Haavistola v. Volunteer Fire Co., 812 F. Supp. 1379 (D. 
Md.) (holding that local volunteer fire company, though regulated and funded by the state, 
was not state actor for purposes of § 1983 under any of the state action tests), revd., 6 F.3d 
211 (4th Cir. 1993). 
172. See, e.g., Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 22-25 (2d Cir. 
1979) (applying both the "symbiotic relationship" and "public function" tests to find state 
action); Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 743-45 (3d Cir. 1978) (applying both the 
"nexus" and "state involvement" tests to find state action). 
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A. The Importance of a Substantive Approach to State Action 
Determinations: The Need for Meta-Analysis 
Tue state action doctrine would benefit from borrowing an ana-
lytical device developed by the scientific community: meta-analysis. 
In the sciences, a study must have a 95% confidence rate before it 
will be accepted as valid.173 A study with a confidence rate less 
than 95% is not accorded dispositive weight.174 In a rough sort of 
way, this corresponds to the requirement that a defendant satisfy a 
particular state action test completely before a court will find the 
presence of state action. 
There is, however, an emerging trend within the scientific com-
munity toward the adoption of a new procedure called "meta-
analysis."17s Meta-analysis involves the grouping together of data 
from studies with confidence rates of less than 95% in order to cre-
ate a single study with a confidence rate that equals or exceeds 
95%.176 Evidently, a growing number of scientists believe that the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Thus, using meta-
analysis, it is possible to reach the requisite 95% confidence level, 
even if none of the individual studies used in the meta-analysis 
meets the 95% threshold.111 
The state action doctrine would plainly benefit from the explicit 
use of meta-analysis. When a particular defendant does not satisfy 
any one of the three state action tests, a reviewing court should step 
back and consider whether the defendant satisfies a sufficient por-
tion of each of the three tests to support a state action finding, even 
if no single test is satisfied completely. 
In fact, a number of the circuit courts of appeals have taken this 
approach when deciding hard cases. In each instance, the use of a 
meta-analysis permitted the reviewing court to make a more re-
fined state action determination. 
In Chalfant v. Wilmington Institute, 118 the Third Circuit was 
173. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 946-49 (3d Cir. 
1990) (describing confidence requirements for scientific studies); see also KENNETH J. ROTH-
MAN, MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 115-124 (1986). 
174. See DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 947; ROTHMAN, supra note 173, at 116-17. 
175. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 
643, 683-85 & 685 n.184. 
176. Id. at 685 n.184 ("Meta-analysis permits the results of several studies to be combined 
to determine an overall relative risk that reflects the best estimate from all of the data."). 
177. Id.; see also DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 948 ("Different studies may each be rejected as 
insignificant, yet, when the studies are looked at collectively, a majority of the data may be 
moderately or strongly contradictory to the null hypothesis."). 
178. 574 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1978). 
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presented with the question whether an ostensibly private library 
was a state actor. According to the plaintiff, the Wilmington Insti-
tute had discharged her on the basis of her gender and had also 
failed to provide her with adequate post-deprivation process.179 
The Institute responded by asserting that, as a private entity, it was 
not required to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.180 
Even though the Wilmington Institute did not fully satisfy any 
one of the Supreme Court's state action tests, the Third Circuit nev-
ertheless found that the library was a state actor. The court ap-
peared to rest its holding on a number of individually important, 
but not decisive, facts: (1) library services, although not an exclu-
sive state function, were a traditional state function; (2) the library 
received significant public funding; and (3) the library's manage-
ment structure was subject to state regulation.181 Essentially, the 
Chalfant court engaged in a meta-analysis: it took bits and pieces 
from each of the state action tests, applied them conjunctively, and 
found that in the "totality of the circumstances," the library was a 
state actor.182 
Significantly, it is doubtful that the Wilmington Institute satis-
fied any one of the Supreme Court's contemporary tests. Library 
services, although associated with the state, are not the "exclusive" 
province of the government.183 Furthermore, the government did 
not control a majority of the library's governing board or determine 
library policies184 nor was there any evidence to suggest that the 
government encouraged or coerced the Institute to discharge Chal-
fant.185 Finally, the state did not derive any direct economic benefit 
from the library nor was the state immediately identifiable with the 
179. See 514 F.2d at 740, 742. 
180. 574 F.2d at 742. 
181. 574 F.2d at 745-46. 
182. 574 F.2d at 745-46. It is possible, of course, to go too far and to find state action in 
the absence of material evidence of a significant connection between the government and a 
private entity. See, e.g., Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 629-34 (2d Cir. 1974) (sug-
gesting that a private foundation might be a state actor based on its acceptance of a tax 
benefit and state regulations of charitable institutions). 
183. See Chalfant, 514 F.2d at 754 & n.10 (Garth, J., dissenting); cf. Terry v. Adams, 345 
U.S. 461, 468-70 (1961) (holding that certain activities, such as elections, are quintessentially 
the province of the state); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) 
(citing Terry for the proposition that a private entity that performs certain "essential" govern-
ment functions is a state actor). 
184. Chalfant, 514 F.2d at 758-60 (Garth, J., dissenting). 
185. 574 F.2d at 756-57 (Garth, J., dissenting); cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that a state utility commission's mere approval of a utility's 
proposal does not convert the proposed practice into state action). 
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library.186 Thus, while the Wilmington Institute did not satisfy com-
pletely any single state action test, significant evidence tending to 
establish state action under each of the tests existed and ultimately 
supported the Third Circuit's resolution of the case. 
The Second Circuit's decision in Janusaitis187 also reflects reli-
ance on meta-analysis. The court explicitly relied on two state ac-
tion tests to support its conclusion that a volunteer fire company 
was a state actor.188 Once again, a blending of the state action tests 
permitted the court to conduct a more refined analysis.189 
Along the same lines, the D.C. Circuit engaged in an open-
ended state action inquiry in Franz v. United States. 190 In Franz, a 
woman in the federal witness protection program had denied her 
ex-husband all visitation rights in violation of a state-court custody 
order.191 Pursuant to the program,192 the federal government had 
provided Catherine Franz with a new identity and refused to dis-
close her location or the location of the couple's children to William 
Franz, her estranged husband.193 William Franz sued the U.S. gov-
ernment, arguing that it had violated his constitutional right of pri-
vacy and failed to provide him with due process before facilitating 
his former wife's decision to deny him all access to his children.194 
The threshold question for the court was whether Catherine 
Franz's decision to deny William Franz his visitation rights was at-
tributable to the federal government. After conducting an open-
ended inquiry, the court concluded that it was reasonable to hold 
186. Chalfant, 514 F.2d at 756-57 (Garth, J., dissenting); cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that the state's anticipated income from a lease contrib-
uted to a finding of state action by the lessee). 
187. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text. 
188. See Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1979). 
189. Ironically, one Third Circuit panel has criticized Janusaitis precisely because it ex-
pressly relied on two state action tests. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 
640-41 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[Janusaitis's] holding is ambiguously grounded in both the exclusive 
government function and the symbiotic relationship tests."). But see Mark v. Borough of 
Hatboro, 51F.3d1137, 1155-58 (3d Cir. 1995) (Greenberg, J., concurring) (arguing that meta-
analysis should be used in lieu of the three traditional state action tests). 
190. 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Significantly, Franz is a post-Blum-Rendell-Baker-Lugar case. Thus, it is not subject to the 
criticism that it fails to reflect the current Supreme Court's state action jurisprudence. Cf. 
Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 341-42 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a 1979 decision of 
the Second Circuit as "archaic" because it predated the Supreme Court's 1982 trilogy of 
cases). 
191. Franz, 107 F.2d at 585-86, 589-90. 
192. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3481-504 (1982) (amended in 1994). 
193. Franz, 707 F.2d at 589-90. The Federal Marshals Service did forward Wiiiiam 
Franz's requests to exercise his visitation rights to Catherine Franz. 707 F.2d at 589-90. 
194. 707 F.2d at 597-98, 607-08. 
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the federal government responsible for Catherine Franz's 
actions.195 
The court initially rested its holding on the nexus test, noting 
that "[t]he nexus is formed principally by the defendants' encour-
agement and support of Catherine's decision to hide the children 
from William."196 The court further explained that "[t]he encour-
agement of Catherine's choice may well be the most important fac-
tor in this case."197 It was not, however, the only factor to be 
considered. 
"Expanding [its] field of vision somewhat," the court then "ob-
serve[d] that the defendant officials and [Charles] Allen 
[Catherine's mob-connected live-in boyfriend] and his household 
also are involved in a symbiotic relationship."198 The court found 
that the government benefited from its relocation of Catherine and 
her children because the relocation facilitated testimony helpful in 
convicting Philadelphia mobsters.199 The court concluded its state 
action analysis by observing that "many analytical roads lead to the 
same conclusion: the defendants are constitutionally accountable 
for the alleged injury to the plaintiffs."200 
Like the Chalfant and Janusaitis courts, the Franz court did not 
mechanically apply the three traditional tests; instead, it carefully 
parsed the relationship of the government to the behavior of 
Catherine Franz and concluded that the government bore responsi-
bility for that conduct. Had the court failed to "expand[] [its] field 
of vision somewhat,"201 it almost certainly would have found that 
Catherine's behavior could not be attributed to the government.202 
There was no plausiJ:>le argument for the satisfaction of the ex-
clusive state function test because child-rearing, the activity directly 
at issue in Franz, is quintessentially a private function.203 More-
over, the nexus test could not be met because the government did 
not encourage Catherine Franz to deny her husband his visitation 
195. 707 F.2d at 590-94. 
196. 707 F.2d at 592. 
197. 707 F.2d at 592 n.38. 
198. 707 F.2d at 593. 
199. 707 F.2d at 593-94. 
200. 707 F.2d at 594; see also Buffalo v. Civiletti, 702 F.2d 710, 716 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding 
that a parent's refusal to honor her ex-spouse's visitation rights constituted state action when 
the federal witness protection program facilitated this course of action). 
201. Franz, 707 F.2d at 593. 
202. See, e.g., Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 340-43 (5th Cir. 1993); Wolotsky 
v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335-38 (6th Cir. 1992); Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 314-17 
(6th Cir. 1988); Crowder v. Conlan, 740 F.2d 447, 450-53 (6th Cir. 1984). 
203. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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rights; it merely facilitated this behavior as an incident of enrolling 
her and her boyfriend in the federal witness protection program.204 
Finally, the government was not in the same kind of symbiotic rela-
tionship at issue in Burton; it did not tacitly approve of Catherine 
Franz's conduct and, in fact, had attempted to assist William Franz 
in gaining access to his children, thereby directly distancing itself 
from Catherine Franz's conduct. Thus, none of the state action 
tests were fully satisfied. 
Franz was properly decided, however, even though no one state 
action test was truly satisfied. First, there was something of a 
symbiotic relationship between the federal government and 
Catherine Franz; the government wanted her testimony and pro-
vided her with a new identity in exchange for her assistance. Her 
new identity, in tum, and the government's refusal to breach its 
promise of secrecy precluded William Franz from bringing an ap-
propriate child custody action against his ex-wife. Moreover, the 
government did facilitate Catherine Franz's behavior by refusing to 
tell William Franz her whereabouts. Finally, the whole course of 
events took place in the overall context of the federal witness pro-
tection program, an exclusive government function. Thus, while no 
one state action test was completely satisfied, all three tests were 
satisfied to a substantial degree. 
Franz, Janusaitis, and Chalfant demonstrate how a state action 
determination can tum on whether the reviewing court takes seri-
ously the Supreme Court's admonition to ''sift facts" and "weigh 
circumstances" in order to ferret out "nonobvious" state involve-
ment in ostensibly private behavior.205 In these cases, the reviewing 
courts examined all aspects of the relationship between the govern-
ment and an ostensibly private defendant and concluded that, in the 
totality of the circumstances, the defendant was a state actor.206 
204. Cf. Dial Info. Servs. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that 
government was not responsible for private behavior that it facilitated but did not 
encourage). 
205. See Burton v. Wilmington Par~ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). 
206. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 590-94 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other 
grounds, 712 F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 
F.2d 17, 22-25 (2d Cir. 1979); Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 740-46 (3d Cir. 
1978). 
Judge Greenberg of the Third Circuit has argued that a totality of the circumstances ap-
proach that includes factors drawn from all three traditional state action tests should replace 
these tests. See Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51F.3d1137, 1155-58 (Greenberg, J., concur-
ring). I believe that Judge Greenberg's proposed approach is only partially correct. If any 
single state action test is completely satisfied, the reviewing court should not be required to 
belabor its state action analysis; his proposal, however, appears to require a totality of the 
circumstances approach in all cases. See 51 F.3d at 1156 ("[C)ourts should consider the prin-
ciples furthered by the previous tests as part of a single balancing and weighing approach."). 
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Essentially, the Franz, Janusaitis, and Chalfant courts engaged in 
the legal equivalent of meta-analysis: they found that the whole 
created from the separate parts was greater than the sum of the 
parts. In so doing, they correctly identified the government's ulti-
mate responsibility for ostensibly private conduct and thereby held 
the government constitutionally accountable for that conduct. 
B. Making Hard Cases Easier 
Only by expanding the state action inquiry - thereby requiring 
the lower federal courts to cast their analytical nets more broadly 
- can actions "fairly attributable to the State" be identified accu-
rately. There is, of course, a place for shorthands, and if an entity 
fully satisfies the criteria set forth in a particular state action test, a 
reviewing court need not belabor its state action analysis. If an en-
tity does not fully satisfy any one of the tests, however, reviewing 
courts have a professional2°7 - if not constitutional - obligation 
to consider the available evidence of state action in the totality of 
the circumstances and deduce on a case-by-case basis whether the 
particular activity complained of had its genesis with the state. 
If such an approach were adopted,20s a number of cases would 
have been decided differently. The volunteer fire company cases 
provide an easy example. If a court examines the question broadly, 
the nature of the service and the existence of state funding and reg-
ulations will together compel a finding of state action in almost all 
instances.209 
This would have the effect of significantly increasing the burden on federal judges charged 
with making state action determinations, without necessarily providing any significant offset-
ting improvement in the accuracy of such determinations. 
207. See, e.g., ConE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr EC 3(A) (1972); see also Roger J. Trayner, 
Who Can Best Judge the Judges, 53 VA. L. REv. 1266, 1280 (1967). 
208. "Adopted" is perhaps inaccurate. As noted previously, the Supreme Court consist-
ently has maintained that state action inquiries are fundamentally fact-based and must be 
made on an individual basis. At the same time, however, the Court has hewed narrowly to 
particular linguistic formulations of the state action inquiry. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 
991, 1003-12 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-42 (1982); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-44 (1982); cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 
614, 619-21 (1991) (using an open-ended inquiry to determine whether the exercise of per· 
emptory jury strikes by private litigants constituted state action); Burton v. Wilmington Park-
ing Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1961) (finding the presence of state action based on a fact-
intensive inquiry into a "symbiotic" relationship between a private restaurant and the state). 
Thus, it might be more precise to say that the Supreme Court should simply enforce its own, 
often-repeated admonition that the various tests it has promulgated do not have a talismanic 
effect. Cf. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 847-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the major-
ity for failing to consider the evidence collectively). 
209. See, e.g., Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dept., 607 F.2d 17, 22-25 (2d Cir. 
1979). 
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Although the Supreme Court's recasting of the question 
presented for review obviated the need for a contacts-analysis in 
Lebron, 210 the Second Circuit's initial treatment of the case would 
have been quite different had it "[e]xpand[ed] [its] field of vi-
sion"211 and considered Amtrak's function, funding, and governing 
structure conjunctively rather than in isolation. 
Cases involving nominally "private" primary and secondary 
schools might also have been resolved differently if the reviewing 
courts had engaged in a more open-ended state action inquiry. 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 212 a case involving a private secondary 
school, is such a case. 
In Rendell-Baker, the Supreme Court held that a privately 
owned and operated secondary school was not a state actor.213 The 
plaintiff class included five teachers and one vocational counselor, 
all of whom worked at the New Perspectives School, a facility that 
educated students with alcohol, drug, or behavioral problems.214 
The vocational counselor, Rendell-Baker, had been hired through a 
federal grant to the school and was discharged over disagreements 
regarding the school's hiring policies.215 The five other plaintiffs 
had written a letter critical of the school's administration to a local 
newspaper and had attempted to form a union.216 All six sued the 
school, claiming that it had failed to provide them with due process 
and violated their First Amendment rights.211 
The New Perspectives School claimed that it was not a state ac-
tor and therefore did not - indeed could not - violate any of the 
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The Supreme Court agreed and 
held that the school was not a state actor.218 In so doing, the Court 
disregarded a number of facts that supported the plaintiffs' conten-
tion that the school should be deemed a state actor: (1) secondary 
education is a service generally associated with the government; (2) 
the state relied upon the school to meet the community's need to 
educate young citizens with drug, alcohol, or behavioral problems; 
(3) the state heavily regulated the school; and ( 4) 90-99% of the 
210. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 964-65 (1995). 
211. Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 593 (D.C. Cir.), modified on other grounds, 712 
F.2d 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
212. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
213. See 457 U.S. at 840-43. 
214. See 457 U.S. at 833-35. 
215. See 457 U.S. at 833-34. 
216. See 457 U.S. at 835. 
217. See 457 U.S. at 834-35. 
218. See 457 U.S. at 837-43. 
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school's annual budget came from the state.219 
Mechanically proceeding through the state action tests, Chief 
Justice Burger failed to consider collectively the evidence support-
ing a state action finding. His majority opinion held that education, 
although associated with the government, is not an "exclusive" 
function of the government.220 It separately explained that neither 
significant public funding nor government regulations can establish 
state action.221 Finally, the Court opined that although the school 
met a community need, it did not stand in a symbiotic relationship 
with the state because the state did not share in the profits gener-
ated by the schooi.222 
In dissent, Justice Marshall conceded that education was not an 
exclusive state function and that funding and regulation by them-
selves do not transform an entity into a state actor.223 Notwith-
standing these weaknesses, however, he observed that "the fact that 
a private entity is performing a vital public function, when coupled 
with other factors demonstrating a close connection with the State, 
may justify a finding of state action. "224 Justice Marshall argued 
that a "more sensitive and flexible" interpretation of the state ac-
tion requirement was needed to analyze properly the relationship 
of the state to the school.225 Essentially, Justice Marshall engaged 
in meta-analysis: he acknowledged that no single test had been sat-
isfied but argued that if viewed collectively, the whole of the evi-
dence exceeded the sum of the parts. Had the majority viewed the 
facts "in the totality of the circumstances," it would have found the 
school to be a state actor.226 
219. See 457 U.S. at 837-43. 
220. 457 U.S. at 842. But cf. Retha Hill, New School Gives Troubled Youths a Chance, 
WASH. PoST, Mar. 22, 1995, at Bl (describing the opening and operation of a new Maryland 
"alternative school for adolescents who have had difficulty in traditional classroom settings"). 
The school is managed and operated by a private contractor, id. at B7, but performs an 
essential, if not exclusive, state function. The school's status as part of Maryland's overall 
educational system was reflected by the attendance of the Lieutenant Governor and State 
Superintendent of Education at the school's opening. Id. at Bl. The school's status as a state 
actor is open to doubt, however, so long as Rendell-Baker remains good law. 
221. See Rendell-Baker, 451 U.S. at 840-41. 
222. See 457 U.S. at 843. 
223. See 457 U.S. at 843, 847-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
224. 457 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
225. 457 U.S. at 851-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
226. See, e.g., Chalfant v. Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 743-45 (3d Cir. 1978) (viewing 
facts under the "totality of the circumstances"). The Court's treatment of Rendell-Baker was 
particularly egregious; her employment with the school was facilitated by a federal grant. See 
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 833. In addition, the decision to hire her was overseen by the 
State Committee on Criminal Justice, and the school's director informed the committee of his 
intention to discharge Rendell-Baker before ending her employment. 457 U.S. at 833-34. 
November 1995] State Action Determinations 345 
In sum, the incorporation of meta-analysis in state action analy-
sis would plainly provide more accurate state action determinations 
because courts would be put to the burden of explaining their state 
action determinations with particularity and care; the mere invoca-
tion of the watchwords or "catch-phrases"227 of the state action 
precedents would not satisfy a reviewing court's obligations. 
Such an approach would also lead courts to reach intuitively 
correct state action determinations with greater frequency. The 
Second Circuit's holding in Lebron that Amtrak was not a state ac-
tor is unconvincing,228 just as the Fifth Circuit's decision in Yeager 
lacks persuasive force.229 The Supreme Court's reasoning in 
Lebron is compelling not only because it comports with one's gen-
eral sense of Amtrak's proper legal status but also because the ma-
jority engaged in a broad factual inquiry regarding the fundamental 
nature of Amtrak and its relationship to the federal government.230 
In approaching the question whether Amtrak was a component of 
the federal government, the Supreme Court considered Amtrak's 
history, its business practices, its financial structure, and its corpo-
rate control structure.231 No one factor or set of factors was dispos-
itive by itself. Rather, in the totality of the circumstances, a 
particular corporation constituted a component of the federal gov-
ernment. State action inquiries in cases involving truly private enti-
Thus, the state had directly passed on her qualifications to hold the position of vocational 
counselor and provided the funds to pay for her salary. The state's involvement in the hiring 
and retention of Rendell-Baker, coupled with the nature of the institution and the public 
need it met within the community, veritably compels a conclusion that, at least with respect 
to Rendell-Baker, the New Perspectives School was a state actor. Even if the five teachers 
employed by the school without direct state supervision could not establish state action, 
surely Rendell-Baker's situation was materially different; however, neither the majority nor 
the dissent made this distinction. 
227. See Black, supra note 13, at 88. 
228. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 390-92 (2d Cir. 1993), 
revd., 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995). The same can be said of many of the pre-Lebron cases involving 
government-controlled corporations. See, e.g., Warren v. Government Natl. Mortgage Assn., 
611F.2d1229, 1232-35 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980); Newman v. Legal Servs. 
Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 541-42 (D.D.C. 1986); Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. 
Broadcasting, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2399, 2403-08 (D.D.C. 1979). 
229. See Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 341-43 (5th Cir. 1993). 
230. See Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 115 S. Ct. 961, 967-69, 973-74 (1995). 
231. See 115 S. Ct. at 967-74. The Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that six of 
Amtrak's nine directors were appointed by the President and Congress, and the remaining 
three were appointed by those six. See 115 S. Ct. at 967-68; see also 45 U.S.C. § 543 (1994). 
Significantly, the Lebron Court did not reach the question whether "control" for purposes of 
corporate law would be a sufficient condition for establishing that a particular corporation is 
a governmental entity. See 115 S. Ct. at 967-75. See generally 13 C.F.R. § 121.401 (1995) 
(defining "control" for purposes of affiliation determinations); 47 C.F.R. § 24.720 (1994) 
(same). Arguably, if the federal or a state government exercises de jure or de facto control 
over a corporate entity, the entity should be deemed an agency or instrumentality of the 
government. It is not yet clear, however, whether the Lebron holding prefigures such a rule. 
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ties232 should be no less open-ended, probing, or careful. 
In a variety of contexts, the Supreme Court has refused to ac-
cord dispositive weight to a single factor or criterion when applying 
a particular constitutional provision or rule.233 There is no reason 
to treat state action determinations any differently. The facts mate-
rial to satisfying any given state action test should be collectively 
relevant, and the tests themselves should be applied conjunctively 
to ensure that the federal courts make accurate - and intuitively 
correct - state action determinations. 
Of course, hard cases will remain. Although more probing fac-
tual analyses would yield better - in other words, more accurate 
- state action determinations, such an approach would not neces-
sarily make deciding state action questions any simpler. On the 
contrary, the mandate of a more probing analysis would require a 
reviewing court to expend greater effort in many cases because it 
would have to puzzle through the intricacies of the relationship be-
tween private entities and the government, both singly and 
collectively. 
Still, the game is worth the candle if one is committed to holding 
the government to its constitutional responsibilities. As Professor 
Henkin pointed out, "No algebraic formula nor any conjuring with 
the words of the Constitution can define with precision the limits of 
the state's choices."234 Analytical shortcuts in state action determi-
nations might save time and effort, but these savings come at the 
price of government-sponsored lawlessness. Such a price is simply 
too high to pay. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The state action doctrine is a necessary analytical construct; it 
permits courts to hold the government accountable and protects the 
freedom of individual citizens to make fundamental decisions about 
232. By this, I mean corporate entities that are not controlled by the government. 
233. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-98 
(1993) (holding that "many factors" bear upon the admissibility of expert testimony, with no 
single factor dispositive); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984) (holding that 
"[n]o single factor determines" whether a Fourth Amendment privacy claim is legitimate; 
instead several factors "are equally relevant"); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 & 290 
n.17 (1983) (holding that "no one factor will be dispositive" when determining whether a 
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments); 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (holding that multiple factors are relevant 
when determining whether a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self. 
incrimination has occurred). 
234. Henkin, supra note 72, at 488. 
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their economic, social, religious, and personal relationships.235 For 
the construct to be useful, however, it must reliably provide accu-
rate determinations about the public or private nature of individu-
als or entities in particular circumstances.236 
Essentially, the state action doctrine is a device that permits the 
federal courts to balance the interests of private individuals and en-
tities in being free from constitutional regulation against the pub-
lic's countervailing interest in ensuring that the government and its 
agents do not disregard constitutional constraints. The current ap-
proach to state action analysis unduly favors the interests of private 
individuals and entities in being unregulated; moreover, it invites 
courts to require a very high burden of proof for establishing gov-
ernment responsibility for private conduct, while at the same time 
excusing them from making searching inquiries into the govern-
ment's potential responsibility for the private conduct at issue. The 
state action doctrine can best serve its legitimate objectives if re-
viewing courts are required to engage in case-specific, factually in-
tensive state action inquiries. 
In sum, the state action doctrine is and, of necessity, must re-
main something of a legal briarpatch. Simplistic tests and other at-
tempts to provide an artificial sense of order cannot tame the 
fundamental nature of the inquiry, which is wild, overgrown, and 
seemingly unmanageable. Like rabbits, judges should be comforta-
ble maneuvering in the briarpatch; exercising discretion and making 
hard choices should come naturally to members of the judiciary. As 
Justice Scalia noted, the terrain of the state action doctrine is "diffi-
cult"237 to traverse, and so it must be if the federal courts are to 
make accurate state action determinations. It's time to go back to 
the briarpatch. 
235. "Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of individual 
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power." Lugar v. Edmond-
son Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982); see also William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional 
Rights: Rethinking "Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 558, 561-67 (1985). 
236. As Justice Douglas explained, "generalizations do not decide concrete cases." Ev-
ans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). The federal judiciary, however, all too often acts as 
though the state action glosses, which are but "generalizations," actually decide concrete 
cases. See generally LLEWELLYN, supra note 11, at 188-89 (arguing that judges must "come to 
recognize the steady and open checking of results against sense and decency as an of-
courseness of our system of precedent when that system is working right"). 
237. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
